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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis considers the relationship between multipolarity and stability in 
Asia. Stability can be perceived as a system’s tendency towards equilibrium 
and will be examined in terms of war avoidance of the great powers and the 
stability of the distribution of power in the region. In the next twenty or 
thirty years, Asia will be increasingly multipolar in the form of either three 
powers (the United States (US), China, and India) or four (the US, China, 
India and Japan). I argue that a more multipolar Asia will reduce the 
likelihood of great power wars because of increasing economic 
interdependence and the calculations by states of their national interests. 
However, in terms of the stability of the distribution of power, the new 
distribution of power will involve a balance between the US, China and 
India, but it still remains contested due to questions raised about China’s and 
India’s legitimacy. In general, while Asia is more likely to be stable in Asia 
if it is multipolar, the likelihood of conflicts between China and India 
remains an open question. I conclude that the stability in Asia depends not 
only on the structure of the system but also other factors such as these major 
states’ uncontrolled actions and behaviors in response to other states in the 
system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a current debate among international relations academics and circles 
about whether the contemporary world system is becoming bipolar or 
multipolar, and which system is more stable or less stable in the wake of the 
Cold War (Christensen and Jack Snyder, 1990; Walt, 2011; Scowcroft, 
2012). This is because, according to realists, the structure of the world 
system (unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity) impacts on the stability of 
its order (Mearsheimer, Summer 1990; Waltz, 1964). In contrast to realists, 
liberals are more optimistic about the prospects for peace in the world, 
especially in terms of Asia, which is appreciated as a distinct area of 
increasing prosperity due to increasing economic interdependence, the 
spread of democracy, and the growth of international institutions. However, 
in the eyes of other scholars, despite enjoying “the most peaceful era” over 
the past decades (Human Security Report 2009/2010: p.45), the Asia-Pacific 
region also remains “one of the leading arenas for great power competition 
and at the same time contains the potential for serious internal conflict and 
disorder” (Ayson, 2005, p. 190). Therefore, this region raises ongoing 
debates by Western as well as Eastern scholars about the reasons why Asia 
has obtained peacefulness over the past decades and whether this will 
continue. The core of these debates relates to whether contemporary Asia is 
becoming (or is already) a multipolar system, and whether such a shift will 
result in a more or less stable system. This paper seeks to examine this 
debate and provide an answer. However in contrast to some of the other 
researchers, it will start by defining the term stability in a wider sense than 
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the common assumption made in much of the literature; that stability simply 
means the unlikelihood of war.  
As will be shown, a system can be said to be stable when it has a tendency 
towards equilibrium and especially in its ability to return or reach a new 
equilibrium. In fact, defining stability in certain perspectives will bring 
different assessments of Asia’s stability or instability in the context of Asian 
multipolartiy due to the characteristics and reciporocal interaction between 
these two variables. If we consider stability as the likelihood of peace and 
war, inevitably we will have different assessments of the situation than if we 
define stability as being related to equilibrium and the avoidance of harm.  
The next part of the dissertation will examine the characteristics of 
multipolarity that influence the stability of international and regional 
systems. It will also investigate the relationship between multipolarity and 
the stability that help us to have objective and unbiased assessments about 
developments in the Asian region as well as the impact of multipolarity on 
Asia’s stability. Then we should be able to examine whether Asia is moving 
toward multipolarity or not.  
The remaining part of this study is devoted to an assessment of stability in 
the context of Asian multipolarity as it applies to a series of real-world issues 
involving the major powers in Asia, including war avoidance by the great 
powers and the stability of the distribution of power. From here, it will 
consider whether multipolarity leads or does not lead to regional stability and 
particularly which elements contribute to Asia’s stability outside of the 
structure of the system that realists always focus on. Analysis in this paper 
will confirm that Asia’s stability depends not only on the structure of the 
system but also on other factors such as economic interdependence, and the 
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understanding of leaders regarding war and peace in the contemporary world 
and their abilities to control states’ fears as they face a security dilemma. In 
general, wars are hard to predict and Asia’s future will remain a mix of 
cooperation and competition between the great powers. While it might be 
unlikely for major wars to occur, in the short term there will be hotspots over 
territorial disputes and nuclear crises in Asia.  
Finally, the concluding section suggests policy implications that follow from 
my analysis. Nevertheless I should note in advance that in this paper I will 
not discuss which pattern is more stable or less stable among unipolar, 
bipolar and multipolar systems. Instead of doing so, I will clarify which 
model Asia might head toward and how this will effect regional stability. 
Will it be more stable or less stable than the past or current system? 
Accordingly, I argue that Asia will be more multipolar with the dominance 
of three major powers including the US, China and India, or of four major 
powers including the US, China, India and Japan; if Japan can overcome its 
current challenges. However, while considering this issue, I find out that it is 
more likely to envisage that Asia will be dominated by three leading powers 
including China, the US and India, instead of four leading powers including 
Japan. Therefore, while assessing the consequences of multipolarty towards 
the stablity of the region in chapter three, I will only take into consideration 
the dominance of the US, China and India in Asian multipolarity due to this 
model’s greater likelihood.  
Why is the topic important? 
 According to international relations scholars in general, Asia is heading 
toward multipolarity (or is already there). It is believed that Asia’s 
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continuing prosperity and security depends upon the stability of the region. 
However some argue that if Asia becomes more multipolar it will become 
less stable. Therefore our analysis of whether Asia is heading towards 
multipolarity or not and the impact of any such change on the stability of 
system will be an important contribution to international relations research as 
well as policy-making in states. For academics, identifying Asia’s future 
changes and their effects on international system will contribute new 
thinking or perspectives under new and different circumstances to 
international relations theories. This is also a concern of some scholars. For 
example, Kang (2003) suggests a new framework of international relations in 
the context of changing Asia:  
             “Efforts to explain Asian issues using international relations theories largely 
derived inductively from the European experience can be problematic” (Kang, 2003, 
p.59). Furthermore, Kang also pointed out that:   
             “The paradigm wars have grown stale: Pitting realism, constructivism, and 
liberalism against one another and then attempting to prove one right while dismissing the 
others has created a body of soul-crushingly boring research. More useful approaches would 
include moving within the paradigms and examining the interaction between the unit level 
and the system. In this vein, recognition that Northeast, Southeast and South Asia may offer 
new insights to international relations theorists should be welcome. Examining the 
possibility that these regions may pose new empirical and theoretical challenges could lead 
to a fruitful research agenda. Moving the field of international relations in this direction 
however will not be easy” (Kang, 2003, p.83).  
In addition, another scholar raises the view that: 
           “either general approach to explaining international relations, realism or liberalism, 
leaves open many  possible predictions in Asia. Only more specific theories within these 
broad schools offer clear predictions, which mean that there is not yet any wide analytical 
consensus to serve as a basis for prescription” (Betts, 1993-1994, p. 74).  
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These suggestions as well as the ongoing debate among international 
relations academics show an expectation of the need for a deeper insight into 
Asian security in the context of Asia’s rapidly economic and social 
development and international and regional security interactions.  
In terms of policy-makers who establish a state’s foreign and national 
policies, an accurate view about Asia’s future will help them set up and 
implement more suitable policies contributing to maintaining peace and 
stability in the region and each state itself, and is indispensable for Asia’s 
continuing prosperity and security. In other words, the actions and responses 
of states in the region have an impact on the others. Therefore, it is important 
to correctly perceive the situations happening in the region associated with 
the multpolar model. For example, does multipolarity really help us 
understand South China Sea issues due to the intertwined interactions 
between several actors inside and outside of the region or does the multipolar 
system help to avoid the great power’s wars or favour instability? The most 
important thing is that in the context of Asian multipolarity, how do state 
leaders perceive the interactions between states and how should states 
develop foreign policies to ensure their national interests in regional peace. 
For example, New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has 
noted:   
            “There are a number of trouble spots in the region, any of which could flare up and 
destabilise the regional and in some cases the global security situation. The obvious areas of  
risk are the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan/China, the South China Sea and South Asia. Conflict 
in any of these areas would affect important New Zealand interests” (New Zealand's 
Foreign and Security Policy Challenges, June 2000).  
Likewise, Australia has shown in a recent study of the government that 
“Australia’s future prosperity and security are inextricably linked to what 
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happens in our region....What the countries of the region, including 
Australia, do to shape the future, through effective statecraft and domestic 
policy reform will be critical” (Australian in the Asian Century, 2012). Or as 
Hillary Clinton said when she was the US Secretary of State- : “Asia’s 
remarkable economic growth over the past decade and its potential for 
continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability that has 
long been guaranteed by the US military” (Clinton, 2011, p. 62). These 
concerns and hopes show that we should try to perceive where Asia is going; 
whether it will be stable or unstable; and how to make it more stable. For 
instance, if multipolarity results in instability in international system as 
realists argue, Chinese foreign policymakers should avoid implementing 
policies that might make more mistrust and misunderstanding to other states. 
As for India, this state should prevent China’s aggression by undertaking 
counter-containment to ensure Indian and regional continuous prosperity and 
peacefulness. Or in case of the stability, the US should contain China’s 
growth by its presence in Asia to avoid Chinese hegemony and to ensure the 
US leading role and its economic interests. So it is hoped that this thesis will 
contribute perspectives about Asia’s future to international academics and 
political leaders to apply to great powers and small powers in the region.  
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CHAPTER ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF 
MULTIPOLARITY AND STABILITY IN 
ASIA 
Literature review  
Asia’s future will be unstable 
Polarity in international relations is a description of the distribution of power 
within the international system. For example, bipolarity is a distribution of 
power in which two great powers have nearly equal influence on the 
international system. Multipolarity involves more than two great powers 
which have considerable amounts of military, cultural, and economic 
influence (N.D.Arora, 2010). In international relations debates, some argue 
that Asia is heading toward bipolarity with the dominance of the United 
States and China (Ross, 1999), unipolarity with the US as hegemon (in spite 
of emerging states) (Berger, July 2000) or a hierarchical order with the 
Chinese dominant and a periphery including surrounding states (Kang, 2003; 
Kupchan, Autumn, 1998). But most scholars affirm that Asia is heading 
towards multipolarity (Friedberg A. L., Winter, 1993-1994; Betts, Winter, 
1993-1994; Berger, July 2000; Thomas J.Christense; Jack Snyder, 1990). 
According to several scholars (Friedberg A. L., Winter, 1993-1994; Betts, 
Winter, 1993-1994; Kupchan, Autumn, 1998; Segal, Summer, 1993), if Asia 
becomes more multipolar it will become less stable.  
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The most influential argument among international relations academics and 
political circles is expressed in the article entitled “Ripe for Rivalry” written 
by Aaron Friedberg (Friedberg, Winter, 1993-1994) and some of his other 
articles (Friedberg, 2000a and Friedberg, 2000b). Under Friedberg’s logic, 
Asia is heading toward multipolarity in the context of the continuing US 
presence and China’s rise as well as other major states emerging in the 
region such as Russia and Japan. The new distribution of power makes the 
region unstable due to great power competition and imbalances in other 
factors between states such as economic development, political regimes and 
the spread of nuclear weapons (Friedberg, Winter, 1993-1994). If the US 
withdraws from the region, states might bandwagon with China and the 
region might be peaceful. However, if the US remains present, there will be 
conflict between these two great powers according to Friedberg. The US will 
be able to accept to some extent China’s ambitions but will not withdraw 
from the region to abandon its earlier predominance while China will always 
want to be dominant in Asia. The balance of power at that time will be 
fragile as China will think that the US is trying to contain her in the region 
(Friedberg, 2000a, p. 156-157). As a result, the relationship between the two 
great powers contains cooperative and competitive elements and they 
consider each other as potential military rivals. The outcome of this rivalry 
will be “the struggle for mastery” in Asia. Actually, in my opinion, 
Friedberg’s approach expresses his weakness in assessing the multipolar 
model in Asia. The reason being, that if the relations of states are only 
focused on these two great powers, that will be a bipolar system, not 
multipolar one as he assumes. Therefore, this weakness will be discussed 
clearly in the third chapter of this thesis.  
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Apart from the relationship between these two great powers, interactions in a 
multipolar Asia impact on other great powers such as Japan, Russia or 
middle powers such as Taiwan and North Korea. Gerald Segal and Richard 
K. Betts foresee prospects of peace and war from a confrontation between 
the US and China; and between Japan and China in a multipolar Asia. Segal 
predicts “the coming confrontation between China and Japan” (1993) due to 
historical resentment and the desires to become a more normal great power 
on the part of the Japanese nationalists and young generations and in the 
context of China’s increasing pursuit of nationalist aims that have been 
manifested by claims of territorial disputes and other activities as well. What 
is more, China always believes that China must have a dominant, not 
subordinate role to any states, especially to Japan in East Asia (Segal, 1993, 
p.28). So, the ambivalence between two great powers might lead to 
confrontation in the future.  
In a similar fashion to Gerald Segal, Richard K. Betts argues that 
multipolarity is the most likely pattern to occur in East Asia with the likely 
dominance of great powers including Japan, China and Russia and an extra-
regional power like the United States. However, East Asia could be unstable 
rather than peaceful due to the flexible alignment of players and China is the 
state most likely over time to disturb the equilibrium in the region and the 
world according to Betts. From the liberal view, if China becomes more 
democratic, it would be good for it and for every one as well. Ironically, 
Chinese leaders perceive liberal ideology as a direct security threat to their 
regime. According to realist views, the answer for the question “Should we 
want China to get rich or not” will be no, because a rich China would 
overturn any balance of power (Betts, Winter, 1993-1994, p. 53-54). 
Therefore, Betts concludes that China’s economic rise would cause conflicts 
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with the United States and other Asian states, especially with Japan; in case 
the United States and Russia withdraw from the region (some would say 
Russia did so in the 1990s but that the US did not). In addition, if Japan 
becomes a normally armed state, it would be the strongest military power in 
Asia and its political frictions with other Asian countries, especially China, 
would increase as the past has shown (all three of Japan’s wars in the past 
originated in disputes related to China). And in reality, there is not any 
reason to prevent Japan’s rearmament. So, Betts asserts that stability in Asia 
in the past depended on the absence of strategic competition between these 
two great powers and that competition will increase in the future in the 
context of the China’s rise and Japan’s rearmament.  
Perceiving that Asia’s geopolitical future is unstable, Kupchan envisages 
chaos with an arms race between Southeast Asian countries after US 
hegemony disappears and the system returns to multipolarity. The 
transformation could trigger conflicts that can override other sources of 
peace (Kupchan, Autumn, 1998, p. 42). According to Kupchan, Asian peace 
over time has depended heavily on the US presence, but US dominance in 
Asia will not last. 
In sum, scholars predict a multipolar Asia will be unstable with prospects of 
Japanese rearmament (Segal, Summer, 1993); China’s revisionism; conflict 
or war over the status of Taiwan (Hughes, 1997); terrorist or missile attacks 
from a rogue North Korea against South Korea, Japan, or even the United 
States (Betts, Winter, 1993-1994, p. 66); and arms racing or even conflict in 
Southeast Asia, promoted in part by unresolved territorial disputes 
(Kupchan, Autumn, 1998, p. 44-45). These predictions are based on the 
following factors: an imbalance of power, wide disparities of economic 
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development (Friedberg, 1993-1994; Kupchan, 1998; Betts, 1993-1994), the 
lack of international and regional institutions (Friedberg, 1993-1994; 
Kupchan, 1998; Betts, 1993-1994); different regimes and cultural-
ideological variables (Friedberg, 1993-1994; Betts, 1993-1994); historical 
animosities and increasing nationalism (Friedberg, Winter, 1993-1994; 
Segal, Summer, 1993) and security dilemmas associated with nuclear 
weapons (Friedberg, Winter, 1993-1994).  
Asia’s future will be stable 
Some who think Asia is heading towards stability argue that the rise of a 
revisionist China along with the declining hegemony of the US leaves a new 
balance of power in the Asian region and results in stability (Alagappa, 
December 2011; Berger, July 2000; Goh, Winter 2007-2008; Acharya, 2012; 
Kang, 2003; White, 2012; Choi, 2010-11-11). The reason for the stability 
and peace mainly comes from economic interdependence (Acharya, 2012; 
Alagappa, December 2011; Berger, July 2000; Kang, 2003; Goh, Winter 
2007-200; Choi, 2010-11-1), the spread of democracy (Alagappa, December 
2011), security requirements, and the deterrence created by nuclear weapons 
(Alagappa, December 2011; Choi, 2010-11-11). Berger indicates that Asian 
States’ “intra-regional interdependence....has pushed up considerably the 
costs of military conflict’, making such conflict less likely” (Berger, July 
2000, p. 417). Alagappa predicts that: “Some conflicts will persist. Asia may 
face new security challenges. Military modernization will continue apace. 
Force will continue to be relevant in international politics and there will be 
military clashes. However, these clashes are unlikely to escalate into large-
scale war....China’s rise can not necessarily have implications of inter-state 
war” (Alagappa, December 2011, p. 165 &175). Alagappa argues that 
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regional cooperation is a key driver for peace and stability over the next few 
decades as the distribution of power will change gradually; economic 
interdependence and the costs of using force make wars highly unlikely 
except for the pursuit of limited goals for all states in Asia, even China. 
Contrary to Friedberg and other scholars, Alagappa emphasizes the role and 
norms of regional institutions:  
“the Asian normative structure enshrines principles and values such as mutual 
respect for the independence, sovereignty, quality, territorial integrity and national identity 
of all nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion; the non interference in the domestic affairs of others; 
the settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; the renunciation of the threat or 
use of force; and effective cooperation action among parties to enhance national well-being” 
(Alagappa, December 2011, p. 179).  
In a similar fashion to Alagappa, Acharya claims that while great power 
competition will not disappear, 21
st 
century Asia can avoid conflicts like 
Europe in the early 20
th
 century due to a combination of three factors 
including economic interdependence, US-centred alliances and cooperative 
institutions (Acharya, 2012).   
While Friedberg is worried that the presence of nuclear weapons might lead 
to instability in Asia, optimists (Alagappa, December 2011; Choi, 2010-11-
11) argue that nuclear deterrence is a catalyst for reducing conflicts in the 
region. Alagappa has argued that: “in an age of nuclear weapons it is hardly 
likely that the US, China or other powers will seek to resolve their 
differences through the use of force...Uncertainty over the outcome of war 
further increases the cost of the force option, making it highly unlikely 
except for limited goals...The slow spread of nuclear weapons in Asia has 
had a stabilizing effect” (Alagappa, December 2011, pp. 174-175). And Choi 
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has affirmed that “nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence among 
great powers will reinforce the stability in Asia. Thus I argue that although 
the system will be changed to a more complex multipolarity, the stable 
balance of power will restrain great powers in Asia while greatly reducing 
the possibility of miscalculations as a main source of conflict”. 
In an article published in 2003 entitled “Getting Asia wrong: the need for 
new analytical frameworks”, David C. Kang rejects Friedberg’s predictions 
that “Europe’s past is Asia’s future” because since the Cold War ended what 
the realists predicted has not come true and they have no evidence to confirm 
their advice to “just wait” (Kang, 2003, p. 61-63). Besides affirming like 
other scholars that increasing economic interdependence raises the cost of 
wars and forces China and other states to hesitate before going to war, Kang 
also believes in historical evidence that Asia was stable when China was 
strong and unstable when China was weak. In contrast to Friedberg and 
Segal’s view, from the view of supporting the hierarchical order in Asia, 
Kang argues that, other states in the region, even Japan, can accept China’s 
role as they did they in the past in the context of China’s efforts seeking a 
compatible solution to engage in international and regional community and 
trying to stabilize the region. Therefore, Kang finds that balancing is not 
occurring against China because “there is likely to be far more stability in 
Asia and more bandwagoning with China” (Kang, 2003, p. 82) and “East 
Asia regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and 
more stable than those in the West” (Kang, 2003, p. 66).  
Uncertainty of Asia’s future 
When considering the application of broader ideas to the Asian context, 
Thomas Berger assumes that there is no evidence that conflicts in Asia are 
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inevitable (Berger, July 2000). Despite the multipolar trend as Friedberg 
argues, Berger asserts that the distribution of power is still a unipolar one 
because there is no country comes close to the US in strategic or 
conventional military capabilities since the end of the Cold War. As a result, 
in contrast to Aaron Friedberg and other realists, Berger shows that recent 
developments such as the balance of power, economic interdependence, and 
the growth in international institutions, geostrategic and geo-economic 
structural forces support greater regional stability whereas other factors 
including China’s rise and culture-ideology contribute to a potentially 
dangerous and unstable Asia. Utilizing both realist and liberal views, Berger 
argues that the North Korean and Taiwanese crises may be resolved; and the 
United States and Japan’s relationship might grow and evolve. Nevertheless, 
from a Constructivist point of view, he argues that keeping a peaceful 
environment in Asia depends on “the intentions and perceptions of the actors 
in the system” that are easily changeable by the understanding of states 
rather than by the balance of power and economic interdependence as realists 
and liberals contend, and so may lead to an unstable Asia (Berger, July 2000, 
p. 406).  
Asia’s continuing prosperity depends on its peace and 
stability 
Apart from predictions of Asia’s instability or stability in the context of 
emerging multipolarity, the second significant aspect which arises from this 
literature review is that many think that Asia’s continuing prosperity,  
security and confidence depend upon a stable region. For example, in 
assessing US strategic choices in Asia, Hugh White affirms that Asia’s 
continuing prosperity depends on its peace and stability and as a result, the 
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United States’ economic interests also depends on this stability. So, the US 
will have three options including “withdrawal, competition and power share” 
with regard to China (White, 2012). Due to US economic interests in the 
region, White argues that the US should take the third option. First of all, 
Asia will continue to be a market for the US due to the region’s dynamic 
development and America’s access to its markets. If the US withdraws from 
the region, Asia will be in chaos because of regional great power 
competition, and this will impact on the region’s and the US economy. In the 
case of competition between the US and China, the US would pay a high 
cost for the economic disruption and major military conflicts. Finally, the US 
can neither withdraw nor compete against China. This means that the US 
should choose the power-sharing option and play a role as an extra-balancer 
in a more multipolar Asia to keep Asia’s continuing peace and stability. 
Given the extra-balancing role of the US, the region will be reassured by the 
balance of power between the US and China; and China and other great 
powers in the region. Therefore Asia will continue its prosperity and 
development and the US will benefit from this stability. Hence, under Hugh 
White’s logic, Asia will become more multipolar but it will not be stable if it 
lacks the presence of the US. The multipolar system here will be either stable 
or unstable depending on the role of the US.  
Not only scholars but also governments express their support for the idea that 
regional stability contributes to regional and national prosperity and security 
in Asia. This argument appears regularly in official publications and 
statements. In the National Security Strategy of the United States from 2002 
to now, governments under different administrations such as George Bush 
and Barack Obama continuously refer to America’s “strategy to promote a 
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stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacific region” (National Security 
Strategy of the United States, September 2002, p. 30).  
Asia’s dramatic economic growth has increased its connection to America’s future 
prosperity, and its emerging centers of influence make it increasingly important. We have 
taken substantial steps to deepen our engagement in the region, through regional 
organizations, new dialogues, and high-level diplomacy. The United States has deep and 
enduring ties with the countries of the region, including trade and investment that drive 
growth and prosperity on both sides of the Pacific, and enhancing these ties is critical to our 
efforts to advance balanced and sustainable growth and to doubling U.S. exports (National 
Security Strategy of the United States, 2010, p. 43)”.  
For its part, China, also has committed itself to “make unswerving efforts to 
safeguard and promote the peace, stability, prosperity and development of 
the Asia-pacific region in particular” (China's National Defense in 2000, 
2000). China's Peaceful Development Road published by The State Council 
Information Office in 2010 argued that a peaceful international environment 
is a good condition for China’s development and prosperity: “China's 
development is an important component of global development. China has 
promoted world peace with its own development and made contributions to 
the progress of mankind.” (White Paper on Peaceful Development Road 
Published, 2010). As well as its interests in world peace, China also 
emphasizes her contribution to regional stability by her efforts engaging in 
international and regional economies and other issues. Also in relation to 
regional stability and security, Australia considers Asia as the world’s most 
dynamic economic region and affirms that “Australia’s future is irrevocably 
tied to the stability and sustainable security of our diverse region” (Australia 
in the Asian Century, October 2012, p. 3). While recognizing challenges 
Asia’s future brings to this country, the Australian government foresees its 
  
17 
opportunities and benefits from the region’s development in the broad 
knowledge that the order of the region will be challenged by Asia’s large 
powers such as China and India but regional security and prosperity 
depending on how major-power relations evolve, particularly between China, 
India, Japan and the United States. Therefore, regional security should be 
sustainable and all states including Australia should take responsibilities for 
a region of sustainable security to remain the regional stability and prosperity 
(Australia in the Asian Century, October 2012).  
Conclusion  
From the above arguments, we can see that many countries believe that 
Asia’s continuing prosperity depends on its peace and stability and that their 
own prosperity also depends upon regional stability. Therefore, the debate 
over whether Asia is becoming more multipolar is important as the 
interactions between major states as well as middle and small states in the 
region depend on the numbers of great powers and relations between them. 
The more states in the system there are, the more complicated interactions 
between states become. It is difficult for states to calculate or to respond to 
the relations with other states. Some states might ally with other states 
against a potential hegemon for example. In this case, it is argued that 
whether Asia becomes less stable. Therefore, the first task of this paper is to 
show whether Asia is moving towards multipolarity or not, and the second is 
to consider the debate as to whether a more multipolar Asia will be more or 
less stable.  
In addition, regional stability has clearly become an important issue and a 
concern of great powers in the world and in the region in particular. Hence, 
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we should find out which factors make stability important in the context of 
Asian multipolarity. Are there several ways of defining the term stability? 
Muthiah Alagappa has rightly noted: “Stability, like peace, is a desirable 
goal, but countries differ on what constitutes stability” (quoted in Ayson, 
2005, p.191). In order to answer these questions, this paper should next 
explore what stability is and consider the relationship between multipolarity 
and stability because we will different outcomes from different perspectives.  
What is stability? 
According to Oxford Advanced Learner’s dictionary, the term stability 
means “the quality or state of being steady and not changing or being 
disturbed in any way (the quality of being stable)” (Oxford Advanced 
Learner’s dictionary, 2013, http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/). In 
international relations, stability may be considered from the vantage point of 
both the total system and the individual states comprising it (Deutsch, 
Singer, 1964). Accordingly, Karl Deutsch and Singer David J. assert that at 
the system level, stability equates to the survival of most of its members and 
the preventon of a single state from becoming dominant. At a subsystem 
level, stability is related to the probability of states’ continued political 
independence and territorial intergrity without any significant probability of 
becoming engaged in a “war for survival” (Deutsch & Singer, 1964, pp. 390-
391). Under this  logic, stability refers to the unlikelihood of conflicts and if 
any state finds itself in a war for survival this will be considered an unstable 
situation. Nonetheless, if we see stability in this way it may be problematic 
due to its insufficiency. In theory as well as in reality it is completely 
obvious that an international system might transfer from an old model into a 
new pattern that is more stable than the earlier one. Of course, in that 
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process, conflict and war is likely to occur. For example, after World War II, 
the world dominated by two great powers (the US and the Soviet Union) was 
more stable than earlier periods when the world was multipolar. (Perhaps 
stability is a measure here of  the avoidance of great power war). Or in 
another example, as we can see, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the world and especially Asia, have enjoyed a peaceful period under 
the unipolar moment of the US hegemon. Thus, we can believe in a fact that 
this transition of power did not bring instability for the system compared to 
earlier periods’ stability.  
In terms of individual states, we also cannot percieve Deutsch & Singer’ 
view mechanically that if wars that can threaten the survival of one or more 
states occur in any region, that region might also be considered unstable. In 
my  opinion, stability in this way is understood in too narrow a sense. Instead 
of thinking in this way, I agree with the stability concept used by 
L.F.Richardson. By his definition, stability refers to any set of conditions 
under which the system would return to its equilibrium state. If any affair 
that would not so return, and rather would continue to change until reaching 
some limit or breakdown point of the system it will be unstable (quoted in 
Deutsch Karl W. and Singer David J., 1964, p. 391). Similarly, Robert 
Ayson also defined stability as including two factors: equilibrium and 
avoidance of major harm to a system (Ayson, 2005). Firstly, a stable system 
to him must obtain and maintain equilibrium. The stability requires the 
ability to cope with external shocks and changes to again reach the 
equilibrium. Therefore, we should keep in mind that we should not 
encourage the perception that stability is synomous with the status-quo, 
which is reflected also in the emphasis on persistence because of a fact that 
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the initial establishment may be not in equilibrium and, so the status quo may 
be instability.  
The second factor that should be perceived is that a system is considered as 
stable if it is able to avoid major harm at both system and individual state 
levels. There are two issues that need to be clear here. First of all, this should 
not be understood as meaning that war is impossible in the stable system 
because “a very damaging war might be considered a stable equilibrium in 
some situations, as might have been seen on the western front in the World 
War for example” (Ayson, 2005, p. 192). Secondly, the “avoidance of harm” 
does not only relate to the avoidance of conflict or war. Instead, it might 
involve the avoidance of economic disruption of states in the region; ie 
economic instability. It is because, as the equilibrium are unobtainable or 
lost, the costs are perceived to be able much higher (Ayson, 2005, p. 192). 
For this reason, elements of stability can be also understood as “the 
durability of a particular equilibrium” that might imply (1) the balance of 
power of two or more states or a particular system of government, for 
example; and (2) especially moving to “a new equilibrium”. In other words, 
the first factor just refers to “preservation” but the second emphasizes a truly 
stable system that has abilities to identify, then provide for a stable pattern of 
behavior and replace the old pattern creating instability for some reasons. So, 
stability can be defined as “the ability of a given system of interstate 
relations to remain peaceful, including its ability to tolerate crises in a way 
which does not increase the likelihood of future armed conflict” (Ayson, 
2005, p. 195).  
In sum, stability can be viewed as a system’s tendency towards equilibrium, 
including its ability to find a new equilibrium in changing conditions. Going 
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even further, Robert Ayson concludes that the existence and durability of 
cooperation in many forms between states in the  system reflect stability in 
interstate relations. An unstable system results from situations where there is 
poor cooperation and where conflict is prevalent (Ayson, 2005, p. 193). 
Thus, we should next examine the relationship between stability and 
multipolarity. How does multipolarity impact on regional stability? Might 
multipolarity completely determine regional stability? 
The Relationship between multipolarity and stability 
Disadvantages of a multipolar system compared to a 
bipolar one 
From the viewpoint of neo-realists, the keys to war and peace lie more in the 
structure of the international system (ie a unipolar, bipolar or multipolar 
system) than in the nature of individual states. Mearsheimer points out that 
“Conflict is common among states because the international system creates 
powerful incentives for aggression. The root cause of the problem is the 
anarchic nature of the international system. In anarchy there is no higher 
body or sovereign that protects states from one another. Hence, each state 
living under anarchy faces the ever-present possibility that another state will 
use force to harm or conquer it. Offensive military action is always a threat 
to all states in the  system” (Mearsheimer, Summer 1990, p.12). Waltz 
argues that stability can be “measured by the peacefulness of adjustment 
within the international system and by the durability of the system itself” 
(Waltz, Summer 1964). Or in other words, “no consequential variation takes 
place in the number of principal parties that constitute the system” (Waltz K., 
1979).  
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Under these assumptions, Mearsheimer and Waltz affirm that the bipolar 
world is in fact the most stable and durable for peace in the international 
system whereas the multipolar system creates more chances for conflict. For 
instance, envisaging Europe’s future in the post- Cold war and its stability, 
Mearsheimer argued: “the bipolar structure that has characterized Europe 
since the end of World War II is replaced by a multipolar structure...The 
prospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly 
if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds” (Mearsheimer, Summer 
1990, p. 7). In order to prove the bipolar system to be more stable than the 
multipolar one, Mearsheimer assumes the most important factor is the way 
that military power contributes to peacefulness or war in the past and even in 
the future of Europe. “The peacefulness of the postwar era arose for three 
principal reasons: the bipolarity of the distribution of power on the 
Continent, the rough equality in military power between those two polar 
states, and the apprearance of nuclear weapons, which vastly expanded the 
violence of war, making deterrence far more robust” (Mearsheimer, Summer 
1990, p. 11). In contrast to this, wars before 1945 all originated from the 
imbalances of power that often occurred among states in the multipolar 
system. 
Compared to bipolarity, multipolarity creates more opportunities for the 
great powers to fight each other since the more great powers there are, the 
more potential conflict dyads there are. This consideration could be 
explained by the fact that with more actors in the system, national interests 
are more complex and accommodation becomes more difficult. Therefore, 
the increase in the number of dyads inevitably leads to increases in conflicts 
of interests (Rosecrance, 1966, p. 329). This is also addressed by Karl 
Deutsch and Singer David J., who discuss the relationship between the 
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number of actors and the stability of the system (Deutsch Karl W. and David 
Singer J., 1964). In addition, a large number of actors can lead to “buck-
passing” (Mearsheimer, Summer 1990, p. 16) which is commonplace in the 
multipolar system, and balancing or bandwagoning behaviors (Walt, 1985) 
between a small power with a stronger power, making it difficult to 
cooperate and to offer deterrence due to a fear of being exploited, or each 
other’s suspicion.  
The second argument is the security dilemma which comes from the 
widespread distribution of nuclear weapons that contributes to destabilizing 
the multipolar system. As Aaron Friedberg showed in the context of Asia, 
some states, such as North Korea, are pursuing the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons, a process which could lead to nuclear escalation in the region. For 
example, efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons in North Korea might 
make Japan consider the possession of nuclear weapons. As a result, a 
similar development of nuclear weapons by Japan might cause China to 
expand and accelerate its nuclear program and hence, other states or areas 
such as Taiwan, India, Japan and Korea would shift their foreign policies in 
the context of nuclear escalation in Asia (Friedberg, Winter, 1993-1994, p. 
27).  
Finally, the multi-polar world would allow more opportunities for 
miscalculations and misperceptions between the many alliances and 
groupings due to more numerous dyads which encourage  shifting coalitions 
and make greater instability (Waltz, 1979; Rosecrance, 1966; Mearsheimer, 
Summer 1990). Local wars can also occur under multipolarity so there 
always is a chance for a small war to trigger a general conflict.  
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Advantages of the multipolar system for stability 
In contrast to these arguments, some scholars favour the multipolar system, 
arguing that this pattern has advantages which make it more stable as a 
system. The most obvious effect of an increase in the number of independent 
actors is an increase in the number of possible pairs or dyads in the total 
system. The more states that share power and influence with each other, the 
more opportunities there are for interactions which force states to inhibit 
their actions to non-alliance nations due to its alliance partners’ different 
relations (Deutsch Karl W. and David Singer J., 1964, p. 392). It means that 
the interdependence of states is higher compared to that of bipolarity so 
states have to carefully think about their responses to the actions of the other 
states in the system. Furthermore, with more than two great powers, world 
politics would not be a zero-sum game (Deutsch Karl W. and Singer David 
J., 1964; Rosecrance, 1966). In other words, the gains of a state or a state 
group would not be equal to the losses of the other. This diminishes the 
tendency to pursue a conflict up to and over the threshold of war. 
The second argument in favour of a multipolar system is the idea that 
reduced attention is paid to other states (Deutsch Karl W. and Singer David 
J., 1964; Rosecrance, 1966). “As the number of independent actors in the 
system increases, the share of the attention that any nation can devote to any 
other must of necessity diminish” (Deutsch Karl W. and Singer David J., 
1964, p. 396). For example, a three state system will produce two possible 
dyads and any state will have a 50 percent share of attention on the part of 
any other. In a four state system, this figure will be 33 percent and with five 
actors, the figure will be 25 percent. A smaller share of attention helps to 
reduce the dangers of mutually reinforcing antagonism between two states. 
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“It shows that the average share of available attention for any one conflict 
drops sharply as soon as there are more than five such centers; and it further 
suggests that the stability of the system may depend critically on the critical 
attention ratio” (Deutsch Karl W. and Singer David J., 1964, p. 399). This 
implication reduces the probability of escalating conflict because in a bipolar 
system, a 10 percent increase in the arms spending of power A must be 
answered by an equal increment in the arms of B, and the escalation process 
may proceed at a 10 percent increment for each cycle. However, in a world 
of four nearly equal powers, the share will be only 5 percent.  In general, 
every increase in the number of powers would slow down the escalation of 
conflict because states have to pay attention to the attitudes of many states or 
align to other states to keep balance of power in a system.  
Finally, the weakness of multipolarity in terms of the diffusion of nuclear 
weapons can be limited by the high costs of conflicts (Mearcheimer, 1990; 
Waltz, 1981). As Mearsheimer has argued “Nuclear weapons seem to be in 
almost everybody's bad book, but the fact is that they are a powerful force 
for peace. Deterrence is most likely to hold when the costs and risks of going 
to war are unambiguously stark. The more horrible the prospect of war, the 
less likely war is” (Mearsheimer J. J., 1990, p. 38). The two atomic bombs 
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the US in 1945 struck not only Japan 
but also caused consternation among the world’s communities (Ngọc, 2012; 
The United States Goverment, 1946; Pennsylvania State University, 1946). 
That was one reason in leading to the “Pacifist Constitution” of Japan later 
(Hughes, 2006; Umeda. S, Article 9, 2006).   
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Conclusion 
From the above arguments, we can see that realists who argue for or against 
multipolar and bipolar systems provide plausible evidence for their 
arguments in the longstanding debate over which system is more or less war-
prone than the other one. In fact, human history has experienced 
multipolarity 6 times and bipolarity only once (Jackson, R. , Sorense, G., 
2001), and seems to support the bipolarity argument. The state system was 
multipolar from its inception in 1648 until the Second World War ended in 
1945. Meanwhile it was only bipolar during the Cold War, but this is a long 
period of peace (at least between the great powers). Furthermore, twentieth-
century European history showed that bipolarity is more peaceful than 
multipolarity. However, if we consider European history in the nineteenth 
century this may not be a right answer. There was no war between any 
European great powers from 1815 to 1853, and again from 1871 to 1914 and 
history witnessed peaceful periods of European history in the nineteenth 
century (Tim, D., Milja, K., Steve, S., 2009, p. 85-89). Moreover, 
contemporary history has witnessed Asia becoming the main hotspot in the 
world with the third nuclear crisis in North Korea and increasing investment 
on military weapons in the Southeast Asian region in spite of this being the 
most peaceful area in the world jn the past decades since 1980 (Bitzinger, 
2010). So, whether the crisis will trigger a large war in this peninsula or even 
a spread of wars across the whole region, the likelihood of wars between 
great powers is still an open question. In fact, if war occurred or this crisis 
continued to last for a long time in this region, will Asia be considered the 
unstable region that realists predict or not? Therefore, defining what stability 
is and at the same time the relationship between stability and multipolarity, 
especially whether Asia is moving towards multipolarity or not that I have 
  
27 
discussed earlier is clearly an absolutely crucial and indispensable step to 
addressing these issues. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: WHERE IS ASIA GOING? 
Before discussing the distribution of power in Asia, I would like to remind 
the reader that as a traditional concept in international relations, polarity is a 
description of the distribution of power within the international system.  
States in bipolar or multipolar models have nearly equal influence 
manifested in the amounts of military, cultural, and economic influence they 
have on the international system. However, the equality of states or 
superpowers today in military, cultural and economic influence is no longer 
explicit, but is relative. Therefore, as we consider the distribution of power in 
Asia today we should keep in mind that the states’ relative power depends on 
others’ relative shift of power rather than separation of ideological or 
historical issues. In other words, the distribution of power in Asia becomes 
more multipolar due to the evolution of history, especially in a globalizing 
age. For example, the US’s relative decline in tandem with the story of 
China’s rise has made the distribution of power in the region more multipolar 
and more important despite the relative disparity of power between states. 
Robert Pape calculated that just over half of the U.S.’s relative decline from 
2000 to 2008 was caused by the spread of technology to the rest of the world 
(Pape, 2009). Fareed Zakaria has similarly argued that the unipolar world of 
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the last two decades is waning not because of the Iraq war but because of the 
broader diffusion of power across the world (Zakaria, 2008).  
In addition, the emergence of more global issues and non-traditional security 
challenges such as climate change, cyber security, and water resource 
security has become a burden on the top of states’ shoulders and requires 
other states’ responsibilities and abilities. As Joseph Nye argues, power 
today is distributed in a much different pattern which resembles a three-
dimensional chess game with the military and economic power being the top 
and the middle chessboards (Nye, 2010). Under this logic, in Asia, we should 
consider what the distribution of the power is among major players including 
China, the United States, Japan and India; and how relations between these 
dyads including China-the US, China-India and China-Japan are. In general, 
China’s rise is the most important factor contributing to the shift in the 
distribution of power in Asia today due to other states’ interactions with 
China in terms of cooperation and competition, and therefore will lead to 
changes in the foreign policies of major states as well as small countries. 
Among these relations, the China - United States dyad plays a prominent role 
in shaping regional order. More importantly, India will not accept a 
subsidiary role to China and as a result, this state will respond to China’s rise 
as a peer competitor. Japan might become a pole due to its capabilities, 
however, this ability is uncertain because of its current and historical 
challenges. In a report prepared by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) 
of the US in November 2008, Richard Haass, president of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, concluded that,  
“the only certainties in today’s world are that geopolitics are becoming more 
multipolar and that America will not stay on top forever” (quoted in Jisi, 
2010, p. 27). Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek, also envisions a “post-
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American” multipolar world where the US will no longer be in a dominant 
position (Zakaria, May 2008).  
China 
Economic capabilities 
The “rise of China” has been voted the most read-about news story of the 
twenty-first century (Top News Stories of the 21st Century, 2012). With 
spectacular growth over the last three decades, China has been transformed 
from a failed attempt at autarkic state capitalism into the world’s second 
largest economy behind the US after surpassing Japan in 2010 (Barboza, 
2010; Breslin, 2011, p. 185). In 1990 it produced 3 percent of the world’s 
industrial output; 20 years later this was up 19.8 percent, overtaking the US 
which had held the top position for 110 years. From 1952 to 1978, China’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) tripled and per capita income grew 180 
percent. Industry’s share of GDP rose from 8 percent to 52 percent, bringing 
the shape of China’s economy into line with the industrial economies of the 
West (Elder & Ayson, 2012). From a starting point of near zero in 1978 to 
by the late 1980s, “China became a member of 700 international 
institutions...1994 enterprises with at least some foreign investment 
employed over 12 million workers, accounted for 13.9 per cent of industrial 
output and conducted 37 per cent of China's total foreign trade” (Berger, July 
2000, p. 417).  
Evidence of the economic rise of China over the past decades includes it 
becoming the world’s major creditor with a total US $ 1022 trillion owed to 
China by the end of 2007 alongside the country’s growing account surplus. 
This comes from the growth of aid and loans, and increasing contribution to 
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regional and international economies (Chin, Gregory; Helleiner, Eric, 2008). 
China’s economic influence has been marked by rescuing Asian economies 
from recession in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997, and even the 
global crisis in 2008 that raised a question posed by Wang and other scholars 
about whether China could save global capitalism (quoted in Breslin, 2011).  
Despite remarkable growth over the past decades and predictions this may 
continue into the future, China’s economy depends upon external access to 
raw materials and energy supplies and relies heavily on exports and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). In other words, China remains a global final 
assembly centre (Athukorala, 2009, p. 235). Therefore, while it may be true 
that China’s GDP may surpass that of the U.S in the next 10 or 15 years, as 
Micheal Beckley shows, “more than 90 percent of China’s high-tech exports 
are produced by foreign firms and consist of low-tech components; and 
China’s quantitative advantage in scientists has not translated into qualitative 
advantages in innovation” (Beckley, 2011, p. 43). This implies that China 
still does not hold all the dollars earned and that the technological edge is 
ultimately not in Chinese hands. Others also argue that China’s economy has 
been slowing, a sign that its economic model may be unsustainable.  
In fact, Chinese economy has had signs of slow growth in recent years but it 
is not easy to see what might happen in future. In other words, there is no 
reason to believe the general trend will be reversed. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in a public report 
released in 2013 reaffirmed that China’s economy will overtake the US’ 
around 2016 (Cooper, 2013). Arvind Subramanian, a well-known economic 
expert, argues that by 2030, the world will become “a near-unipolar one 
dominated by China” (Subramanian, 2011). Accordingly, China will 
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generate close to 20 percent of global GDP while the US’ contribution will 
just under 15 percent and China's per capita GDP (in terms of purchasing 
power parity) will be more than half that of the United States and greater 
than the average per capita GDP around the world.  
In sum, by 2030, China will become the dominant economy in the world in 
which there will be no states catching up as peer competitors (Subramanian, 
2011). This projection is also similar to the prediction of the World Bank 
which has modelled future economic multipolarity in which China will 
contribute about one-third of global growth by 2025, far more than any other 
economy (World Bank, 2012). If negotiations on a free trade agreement 
between China and Japan and South Korea are successful, positive prospects 
await China’s economic development in terms of the impact on other 
economies in the region (Chris Elder, Robert Ayson, 2012).  
Middle income trap, gap between the rich and the poor 
One of the economic and social challenges China faces is the gap between 
the rich and the poor. There is also the issue of the middle income trap. 
According to a private study, China’s Gini coefficient was 0, 61 in 2010 (Hu, 
2012). This is an alarmingly high level among countries in the United 
Nations
1
. In the meantime, China’s GDP in 2012 grew at the slowest rate in 
over 13 years. As a result, it is doubtful that whether or not China can escape 
the trap that affects most middle income countries get trapped, at least at a 
certain period of their development. However, some studies show that China 
                                                     
1 The Gini coefficient measures the wealth gap on a scale of 0 to 1. The higher the figure is, the greater 
the inequality is. A figure above 0.4 usually marks strong inequality. 
(http://english.caixin.com/2012-12-10/100470648.html).  
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can escape it due to its advantages such as “a healthy share of high-
technology products in its exports, and a population with better education 
than other middle-income countries” in comparison with other middle-
income countries (Schuman, 2013).  
Military capabilities 
Economic development has created more opportunities and essential 
conditions for China to develop its military capabilities. Chinese defense 
spending has also increased over past decades. The military budget doubled 
from 1989 to 1994, 1994 to 1999 and again from 2005-2009 (Beckley, 2011) 
and accounts for 2.5% of its GDP (Dobbins, War with China, 2012, p. 8). 
China’s military expenditure increased from $US37 billion in 2000 to $166 
billion in 2012. Between 2003 and 2012, China’s military budget spending 
rose by 175 percent in real terms, the largest increase for the period among 
the top 15 countries, giving China the world’s second position in the list of 
the top 15 military spenders in 2011 and 2012 (Sam Perlo-Freeman, 
Elisabeth Sköns, Carina Solmirano and Helén Wilandh, April 2013). China 
has developed land-based ballistic and cruise missile systems, for example 
the DF-21D and in the air China will also deploy the J-20 stealth fighter. 
China’s plan requires an increase in defense spending by 11.2 percent in 
2012 as the country’s expanding global commitments and lingering 
territorial disputes drive demand for more warships, missiles and fighter 
planes, costing around 670 billion yuan ($106.4 billion) (Bloomberg News, 
2012). Its military modernization including naval modernization efforts 
include “a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship 
ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, and surface ships as well as reforms 
and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel 
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quality, education, training, and exercises” (O'Rourke, 2012). This military 
modernization and expanding make the US worried about practicing its 
sovereign requirements and undermining the US’ influence in Pacific Asia. 
In addition, the US is afraid of China’s striving to become a global power 
that this state has been occupied since the Cold War.  
Beyond conventional weaponry, China has advantages in exploiting the 
possibilities of cyber warfare to fight hi-tech wars. One of the chief strategies 
of China is the combination of “computer network cooperation (CNO), 
electronic warfare (EW), and kinetic strikes designed to strike an enemy’s 
networked information systems, creating “blind spots” that various PLA 
forces could exploit at predetermined times or as the tactical situation 
warranted” (Krekel, October 2009). China is developing computer network 
exploitation (CNE) to collect intelligence information. China’s spy network 
aims at acquiring knowledge about the military technology of the U.S. 
military and the West, thereby allowing Beijing to depend less on the foreign 
weapons manufacturers. Moreover, this network can support the planning of 
the Chinese military to build a picture of the U.S. defense network, and 
logistical and military capabilities related to China. This source of 
information can be exploited when a crisis occurs. Clearly, the power to 
exploit cyber war-fare as one of the seven elements that constitutes 
comprehensive national power will be transferable into a powerful national 
defense (Yang, 2010, p. 149), leading to a threat to US military access to the 
air and sea perimeter of the Asian mainland (Chris Elder, Robert Ayson, 
2012).  
However, some argue that China’s military does not have a global reach, and 
that China is only a regional power (Chris Elder, Robert Ayson, 2012). In 
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other words, despite increasing efforts in military modernization over the 
past decades, China has still not caught up with the US in terms of not only 
military infrastructure but also experience (An, 5/13/2013). U.S. forces have 
been deployed regularly since the Gulf War while the Chinese Army (PLA) 
has not been operational since the 1979 war against Vietnam. The greatest 
weakness of China is located in the motor industry. For example, the stealth 
fighter J-20 (that aims at competing with F-22 or F-35 of the United States) 
still depends on Russian or a number of weaker domestic engines (An, 
5/13/2013).  
 Political system 
Pessimists are worried about the effects of China’s political system on its 
future development because of the strict control of a one-party state that is  
in part “socialism with Chinese characteristics” and of course is an adversary 
of Western democracy (WeiWei, Spring 2013). Nevertheless, the one-party 
state has advantages as well as disadvantages. Accordingly, it can constrain 
new ideas and undermine development to a certain extent. Yet this system 
supports political stability (at least for the time being) - a necessary condition 
for sustainable economic development. China’s so-called ‘‘selection plus 
election’’ political model reflects the performance of candidates and public 
support. Furthermore, the Confucian tradition of meritocratic governance 
emphasized under several administrations, especially in choosing leaders at 
the 18
th
 Party Congress, shows that China sees a meritocratic administration 
as clearly contributing to the successful economic and social reform of China 
over the past decades. One scholar argues that in “Confucian tradition of 
meritocracy, a state should always strive for what’s called shangshangce, or 
the best of the best options by choosing leaders of the highest calibre.... 
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China’s meritocratic model of ‘selection plus election’ now seems 
increasingly in a position to compete with the Western model of popular 
democracy....Leaving aside sensational official corruption scandals and other 
social ills, China’s governance, like the Chinese economy, remains resilient 
and robust” (WeiWei, Spring 2013). Actually, it is still too early to affirm 
whether or not the Chinese political model is best suited to a growing 
economy and can apply to other countries as American democracy has done 
to some degree at least. However, as argued above, at least at the present, the 
Chinese political model has worked effectively for the overall development 
of the country.  
Capacity for influence  
China’s economic rise clearly increases its influence in the world and 
regional system. Firstly, it impacts on political issues in other countries and 
secondly it raises China’s prestige and voice in the world and regional 
organizations. Like the US during the 1956 Suez crisis, China has also used 
the advantages of foreign exchange reserves as a tool of foreign policy. She 
has promoted overseas investment and increased overseas aid to increase her 
influence, particularly political influences in invested countries, especially in 
Africa which is rich in natural resources (Deborah Brautigam, 2010).  
In the case of the South China Sea, Cambodia and Laos blocked the joint 
statement criticizing Beijing at the ministerial meeting of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Cambodia in 2012, thus preserving 
their relative gains with China. This was the first time in ASEAN’s history 
that members did not agree on a general statement of the meeting as the 
Chairman from Cambodia did not agree to include the language in the final 
joint statement referring to the contention of the Philippines and Vietnam 
  
36 
over recent territorial disputes in the South China Sea with China. 
Accordingly, Cambodia insisted that such disputes should be managed 
bilaterally, which is also China’s policy (“Asean nations fail to reach 
agreement on South China Sea”, BBC news, 2012; Launey, 2012). Some 
diplomats suggested that Cambodia had been influenced by its giant ally 
China. Cambodia is one of China’s oldest and closest allies and 
economically, China is Cambodia’s biggest foreign investor and an aid 
donor. Foreign direct investment flows are seen as a main driver of economic 
development and liberalization in Cambodia
2
 (Heng, 2012).  So, Cambodia 
is unlikely to turn its back on the opportunities China offers from economic 
investment and aid.  
The case of Cambodia points to the fact that China’s economic rise has had a 
considerable influence on other governments’ decisions and policies to 
ensure its relative gains. This also shows that the rise and fall of great powers 
has been primarily achieved by changes in relative economic strength 
(Robert Pape, 2009). That is one of reasons why scholars and research 
organizations attribute the shift in global power from West to East in the 21
st 
                                                     
2 Chinese leaders repeatedly visited Cambodia with several gifts since early 2012 as Cambodia holds 
the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN. For example, in late February, China donated Cambodia a 
package of equipment worth $430,000 USD to host ASEAN Summit in Cambodia. In  
3/2012 Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged to support Cambodia to become a non-permanent member 
of the Security Council of the United Nations. In 5/2012 China announced to donate Cambodia $ 20 
million USD to strengthen defense. In 7/2012, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi also met with 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen a few days ahead of the Meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers and 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Phnom Penh. Furthermore, Cambodia and China met on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN meetings and the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi expressed his 
appreciation for Cambodia's long-standing firm support for China on issues concerning Chinese core 
interests. Cambodian Foreign Minister, Hor Namhong expressed his thanks to China for giving a 
430,000 USD aid donation to celebrate the ASEAN summit.    (Trung Quốc đổ hàng tỉ USD vào 
Campuchia, tuoitre online, 7/15/2012. http://m.tuoitre.vn/tin-tuc/The-gioi/The-gioi/147353,Trung-
Quoc-do-hang-ti-USD-vao-Campuchia.ttm) (Cambodia will receive 12 military helicopters of the 
Chinese Z-9). 
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century in the context of increasing economic development towards 
multipolarity in Asia-Pacific: the so-called “ Asian miracle” (Layne, 2012; 
Scowcroft, 2012). In fact, the success of the Chinese economic model can 
influence other states as some countries and people might wish to pursue 
China’s model of development, the so-called “Beijing consensus”3 rather 
than the “Washington consensus” as observed by Nye and Wang (Nye and 
Wang, 2009).  
China’s economic growth and military expansion has undoubted effects on 
the regional and global international system. Apart from direct influences on 
other countries’ political behaviour, especially small and poor countries, its 
international clout in regional and international organizations has increased 
as well. Despite having no hand in shaping the form of the major 
international institutions in the post war, China nowadays has tried to renew 
these organizations aiming at its objectives and interests. For instance, 
China’s opposition to some of the rules designed by Western states has made 
it impossible for the Doha Round of world trade talks to come to a 
conclusion (Chris Elder, Robert Ayson, 2012). Moreover, China also 
actively encourages changes to institutions to protect its interests as well as 
reduce constraints from other great powers like the United States. China’s 
efforts to internationalize the Renminbi when in 2009 Central Bank 
Governor Zhou Xiaochuan called for establishing a “super sovereign” 
currency to replace the US dollar or a review of the global financial system 
                                                     
3 The “Beijing consensus” was based on the Asian Miracle and it encouraged education, innovation, 
experimentation and sustainability. The model was not a “one size fits all” model like the Washington 
consensus. It did not believe democracy was the key to development. China said that the better 
economic model is maintaining strong state’s control of key sectors, and should encourage innovation; 
it does not allow too much freedom to financial situation. China’s economy seemed to flourish by 
using this model. On one side, an authoritarian government with a market-oriented economy. On other 
side, market economics with democratic government (quoted in (Yang, 2010). 
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by President Hu Jintao at the G20 summit (Chris Elder, Robert Ayson, 2012, 
p. 5) or vetoing the US’ decision to go to war with Iraq are evidence for this 
power assumption. Although China has benefited from the existing 
international order, Beijing remains suspicious of the international system 
dominated by the West, particularly the United States. According to Foot, 
Chinese “mainstream strategy analysts” have “overall perceived a consistent 
and malign US strategy of global domination”, and consider US hegemony 
to be “predatory in nature” (Rosemary Foot, 2006). Dr Jian Yang (November 
2008) argues that Chinese leaders are not shy in calling for a fairer 
international order. In his address at the United Nations Summit on 15 
September 2005, President Hu Jintao declared that China would “actively 
participate in international affairs and fulfill its international obligations, and 
work with other countries in building ...a new international order that is fair 
and rational” (quoted in Yang, 2008, p. 1). 
 “China’s peaceful rise” and territorial claims 
“China’s peaceful rise” is the term that was used originally by Zheng Bijian, 
one of the leading intellectuals since Deng Xiaoping began China’s process 
of opening and reform, at the 16
th
 National Congress of the Communist Party 
in December 2002. The concept implies that unlike past rising powers that 
pose threats to other states, China will work very hard in its own way, a way 
that is not based on terrorism or the use of force to advocate a new 
international political and economic order to integrate into the international 
system. So China needs the help of the rest of the world in order to employ 
its responsibilities towards international affairs. The term “China’s peaceful 
rise” was then changed to “peaceful development” (China's Peaceful Rise: 
Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2005, 2005). 
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            “Our path is different from both the paths of Germany in World War I and Germany 
and Japan in World War II, when they tried to overhaul the world political landscape by way 
of aggressive wars. Our path is also different from that of the former U.S.S.R. during the 
reign of Brezhnev, which relied on a military bloc and arms race in order to compete with 
the United States for world supremacy.  
            Our brand new path relies upon the following factors, namely: relying on our own 
development; relying on the opening up of markets; relying on institutional innovation; 
relying on getting connected with economic globalization instead of being isolated from it; 
and relying on reciprocity and mutual benefit with other countries for the purpose of win-
win relations” (China's Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2005, 
2005, p.5-6). 
In reality, on the one hand China’s rise contributes to the prosperity of Asia 
due to its economic capabilities, but on the other hand, it makes the regional 
and international community more worried due to China’s increasingly tough 
and truculent behaviors toward its neighbors in Asia as well as the US and 
the European Union. China has continuously published territorial claims 
overlapping the sovereignty of other states on South China Sea and 
Senkaku/Diafao. In the Indian Ocean, a place where nearly 90 percent of oil 
must cross to come into Chinese market, China has exercised the “Strings of 
Pearl” strategy making India worry about the potential for China to project 
her power in the Indian Ocean that is traditionally considered as India’s 
backyard (Brewster, Spring 2010).  
In practice, it is not difficult to see that the attitudes and actions of China are 
mainly driven by an aspiration for global dominance or at least regional 
dominance which has been supported by its economic development and 
military expansion. Despite a series of actions designed to meet the 
objections of most states regarding the territorial disputes in the region, in 
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recent years China has issued new passports which include maps of 
overlapping claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. India also has had quarrels with China over maps in passports 
and visa stamps. These actions have met with strong criticisms by relevant 
states such as the Philippines, Vietnam and India (China maps path to new 
conflicts in its passports, 2012). 
In sum, China’s expanding economy and military have resulted in an 
increasing international clout which leads to a new distribution of power in 
the world and Asian region. Nonetheless, this judging does not mean that the 
global aspiration or only the regional supremacy of China might become true 
within the next two decades. In other words, it seems not to be true as argued 
by some scholars (Kang, 2003; and Kupchan, Autumn, 1998) that China will 
dominate Asia due to its rise in tandem with the US’ withdrawal from the 
region. That is because despite its relative decline as some have argued, the 
US is still an extra-regional balancer in the Asian region due to its abilities 
and aspiration as well as Asian states’ wishes for the US’ presence to 
constrain China’s rise.  
The United States  
The economy  
It is said that the US’ power has declined in relative terms due to problems 
involving its economy and military; and that it will withdraw from the region 
with China’s replacing it (Kupchan, 1998; Kang, 2003). In reality, we can 
see a fact that the US’ economy has only declined relative to China’s 
economic rise, and moreover, the US economy is still able to compete with 
China’s economy. Some signs show that the growth rate of China’s economy 
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has slowed since 2012. As China enters the third phase of economic 
development (technological innovation) its growth rate will be much lower 
than now because growth will then rely almost exclusively on innovation 
(the US is about 2-3 percent), and a 7-9% technological innovation rate is 
unprecedented (GlobalChinatrade.com, 2013). In addition, although the U.S. 
economy grew at a modest rate of over 2 percent in the last decade, this 
figure fails to take into account the huge profits made by overseas American 
firms (Aubin, 2013; LineBaugh, 2013), many of them in China (this is the 
converse with China’s economy that has been analyzed above).  
Secondly, if one looks into its economic competitiveness, the U.S. still 
greatly outperforms China as well as other possible challengers in almost all 
indicators. According to the 2012-2013 Global Competitiveness Index 
announced by the World Economic Forum, the U.S. ranks 7
th
 among 144 
surveyed countries/economies while China trails at the 29
th
 place, behind 
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia (Klaus Schwab, 2012). U.S. spending on R&D 
still accounts for 50 percent of the world’s most advanced scientific articles 
(Beckley, 2011, p. 64). With regard to financial factors, the US dollar 
remains the world’s main reserve currency, a fact which Susan Strange 
called structural power (Christopher May, 1996), accounting for 60 percent, 
with 27 percent for the Euro, and the rest for other currencies (North, 2011). 
Despite China’s efforts to internationalize the Renminbi, it is hard to believe 
that it will become the world’s principal reserve currency in the foreseeable 
future.  
Being the world’s number one economy, the US economy influences almost 
all states in Asia and globally. As for Asian economies, the US has still 
played an important role in maintaining prosperity and the stability as well as 
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a liberal global trade and financial system in the region. Firstly, the US is one 
of the world’s most populous and wealthy states, so the US market requires 
several sources of goods and products to be good in quantity and quality as 
well. This is especially important for several Asian economies depending on 
exports. In the list of the US top ten countries exporting to the US, there have 
been five countries in Asia including China, Japan, Canada, South Korea and 
Taiwan. Among them, China is the biggest exporter to US with US $ 334 
billion in 2010, exporting mainly computers (Waksman, 2012). The 10 years 
from 2000 to 2013 witnessed the rapid expansion of China-US trade and 
economic relations. Two-way trade increased 180 times growing from $2.4 
billion in 1979 to $446.64 billion in 2011. In 2012, China’s imports from US 
were US$ 119.2 billion whereas China’s exports were US$ 319.4 billion, up 
by 8.1% and 8.2% respectively (Record High China-US Trade close to US$ 
500 billion, 2012). The most important point here is that both states are the 
second biggest partners of each other (Hien tai va tuong lai cua quan he 
Trung My, 2012). Actually, the US is focused on exports to China’s growing 
markets, while China is seeking to buy more high-tech products from the US 
(Clinton, American Pacific’s century, 2011).  
More particularly, the United States has played an important role in driving 
Asian economies to enter liberal and open economic policies. The US has 
long encouraged its East Asian partners and important countries of the 
region, like China, to adopt these policies to a degree. Consequently, East 
Asian economies have become an economic dynamo, a global economic 
player and an engine of global economic growth at a time when a number of 
OECD countries have been growing relatively more slowly and have not 
been able to generate the kind of demand needed to boost global growth. The 
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key role of the US in this process has been proved as a vindication of its 
approach (Petras Austrevicius and John Boozman, 2007).  
In fact, the US is the important import market of several countries in the 
world, especially in Southeast Asia. As a result, as the US economy turned 
into recession, the export of countries was affected negatively. Some 
economies such as Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong were also in 
deep recession. Other economies’ growth became slowed (Hong Kong falls 
into recession: government, 2008). The Europe economy having strong ties 
to the US economy was seriously impacted in terms of finance and economy 
as well (Fackler, 2008). Several financial organizations were broken down 
and created the financial crisis in some countries such as Iceland and Russia 
(Dougherty, 2008). The regional biggest economies including Germany and 
Italia also dropped into recession and the English, France, and Spanish 
economies also reduced their growth. The Europe zone officially was in the 
first economic recession since its establishment (AFP, 2008). In general, the 
slowing world economic growth after the 2008 crisis reduced the demand 
and price of oil damaging the oil production countries. This resulted in a 
global food crisis in 2008 (Shah, 2008). These all show an experience that 
the US economy’s shift will impact on Asian economies and global economy 
as well in present and in the foreseeable future.   
Military capacity 
In terms of its economy, the US might be in relative decline in comparison 
with China and other emerging states. Nonetheless, in terms of military 
power, the US is still the biggest country in capacity and military spending. 
For example, in 2008, the U.S defense budget was US$607 billion which 
was nearly half of the world’s military spending and higher than that of 
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combined four major states considered as presumptive challengers including 
China, India, Japan and Russia and even outweighed the 27 states of the EU. 
Despite a fall of 6 percent in 2012, the US military spending in this year was 
still 69 percent higher than that in 2001 when the ‘global war on terrorism’ 
began and was still more than the combined spending of the next 10 
countries (Sam Perlo-Freeman, Elisabeth Sköns, Carina Solmirano and 
Helén Wilandh, April 2013). Furthermore, this fall was related to a reduction 
in spending on Overseas Contingency Operations (OCOs) in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, from $159 billion in 2011 to $115 billion in the 2012 countries. 
Meanwhile, China’s military budget was just one-fourth of the US’ with US 
$166 billion compared with America’s $682 billion (Sam Perlo-Freeman, 
Elisabeth Sköns, Carina Solmirano and Helén Wilandh, April 2013).  
In terms of its naval force, the U.S has the ability to project power quickly 
and over great distances due to a big naval tonnage that exceeds the world’s 
next 17 fleets combined. For instance, it is certain that today China, Russia, 
Japan, India, and the EU cannot conduct a major war 8,000 miles from their 
shores whereas the United States has this done twice in Iraq and once in 
Afghanistan in the past decade (Joffe, September/October 2009, p. 26). Not 
only by sea has the US military achieved a rapid response and shown the 
ability to acquire facilities in emergency circumstances. For example, in 
NATO’s victory in Libya, the first lesson experienced was that NATO’s 
members heavily depended on the US military, and needed to strengthen 
NATO’s basic infrastructure to increase its role in global security. In this 
war, the US military provided 75 percent of the intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance data, refuelling planes and dispatched 100 military personnel 
to the NATO targeting center to protect Libyan citizens and enforce the arms 
embargo (Stavridis, Ivo H. Daalder and James G., June 2012, p. 11). As a 
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result, this rapid response rescued the people of Benghazi, obliterated 
Libya’s air defense system within 72 hours, and deployed aircraft and naval 
vessels to enforce the UN resolution (Joffe, September/October 2009, p.11).  
The US military has also played an important role for many Asian states. 
Japan is a good example in point. This state has no nuclear weapons and put 
its security under the US security reassurance since the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan signed in 1951. The 
treaty established that any attack against Japan or the United States 
perpetrated within Japan’s territorial administration would be dangerous to 
the respective countries' own peace and safety. In fact, US reassurances are 
one of the reasons why it is believed that Japan has not rearmed significantly 
even though the US has urged Japan to have more responsibilities in 
international affairs (Betts, 1993-1994, p.56; Mulgan, October 26th, 2010). 
In order to face China’s rise, Southeast Asian states such as the Philippines 
and Thailand, formal allies of the US, and other states such as Singapore, 
Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Burma and Malaysia have taken advantage of US 
military capabilities to cope with China. Both Thailand and the Philippines 
have been designated as major non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) allies. Asian states consider the US as an extra-balancer to China’s 
counter-containment. Evelyn Goh argues that, “in Southeast Asia, indirect 
balancing of growing Chinese power hinges on three elements. First is the 
strong expectation of deterrence, particularly in harnessing superior U.S. 
forces  in the region to persuade Beijing that any aggressive action would be 
too costly or unlikely to succeed” (Goh, 2007-2008, p.133).  These states not 
only attract US military assistance, and participate in bilateral and 
multilateral joint exercises to strengthen their military capabilities but also 
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provide the US military with bases to “further buttress US military presence 
superiority in the region or to demonstrate the ability to harness it, to act as a 
general deterrent to Chinese (or other) aggression...These balancing policies 
are indirect, because they “borrow” US military power, are not explicitly 
targeted against specific Chinese military threats, and are often undertaken in 
the name of other types of security interests shared with the United States” 
(Goh, 2007/2008, p. 133).  
Despite the growth in China’s military power, there is no doubt that the US 
remains by far the strongest military power both in the Asia Pacific region 
and globally. According to the appreciation of Global Firepower.com (GFP), 
the US ranks the first among the top of the strongest ten states in the world in 
terms of military strength (exclude nuclear capability) in 2012 (10 quân đội 
hùng mạnh nhất thế giới, 2013).  
From making the comparisons in terms of economy and military, it seems 
that the US still has sufficient capabilities to retain its role in the Asian 
region as an extra-balancer. It means that the US’ presence in Asia keeps a 
check on the rise of China’s power in the region, and helps to maintain a 
balance between China and the US, and other states, thus preventing Chinese 
hegemony.  
Soft power 
 
It is said that US soft power has reduced in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks due 
to foreign policies under the George Bush Administration (Nye, 2004 and 
2008).  This is true but there is no denying the fact that US soft power is still 
very strong and is able to project in the Asia region and globally. Firstly, 
American values and culture still represent the West’s liberal democratic 
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values and norms. Secondly, America’s Hollywood movies, McDonald’s and 
pop culture, and advanced education and universities still attract billions of 
people around the world. Hollywood products are present in every corner of 
the planet, even in North Korea. America has the world's largest publications 
in terms of newspapers, and magazines such as the New York Times, Time 
magazine (Time) and the Washington Post). In terms of higher education, the 
US is still a wonderful destination of most students in the world as a study 
shows that “the US is home to fifteen of the top twenty universities in the 
world” (Beckley, 2011/2012, p. 66).   
 
In reality, since after the September eleven attack and under the George 
Bush’s administration, the US’ soft power declined due to “hawkish” 
policies that led to “anti-Americanism” (Nye, 2004). However, the election 
of Barack Obama as the first nonwhite President and the appointment of 
Hillary Clinton as Secretary of state boosted the US image in Asia (Jisi, 
2010, p. 37). Moreover, as Barack Obama come to power, he recognized the 
declining soft-power of the US, and has been determined to change the US 
image through reforms aimed at restoring the power, prestige and position of 
the United States. In his inaugural address in 2009, President Barack Obama 
has clearly stated policies of the new government: "To the Muslim world, we 
seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect" and 
he promised the United States will seek the cooperation and greater 
understanding between peoples (Obama, 2009). 
 
According to a public opinion survey done by the Chicago on Global Affairs 
in 2008, America’s soft power in Asia greatly exceeds that of China. The US 
was ahead of China in four categories including politics, human capital, 
economics, and diplomatics (Jisi, 2010, p. 37).  
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The US pivot policy 
Facing the challenges from China’s rise and urgent demands of economic 
interests from the Asian region, the US decided to turn towards the Asia-
Pacific through the “pivot to Asia” regional strategy that was marked by the 
statements of President Barack Obama and the new Defense Strategic 
Guidelines, and especially a major article written by the former Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton in 2011. In her article, the Secretary of State claimed 
that the US will invest time and energy in the Asia Pacific region to sustain 
its leadership, secure interests and advance its values. Furthermore, Hillary 
Clinton also emphasized the US role in maintaining peace and security 
across the Asia-Pacific “through defending freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or 
ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region's key players” 
(Clinton, 2011, p.57).  
Despite denials from the US, China has seen this strategy as constraining the 
China’s rise to retain America’s supremacy in Asia Pacific because China’s 
rise has threatened US dominance and favored a new distribution of power 
(Liu, 2013; and Han Sung-Joo, 2008). It is right as some argue that on the 
one hand the US will not withdraw from the Asian region and allow China to 
replace it (White, 2012; Betts, Winter, 1993-1994; Choi, 2010-11 and 
Friedberg, 1993-1994). On the other hand, the US cannot cope with China’s 
rise on its own (White, 2012). Instead of doing so, the US inevitably needs to 
pay renewed attention to Asia-Pacific due to its dominance and economic 
interests in this region. Therefore, China’s rise and her ambitions surely face 
challenges from US constraint in the region as well as increasing demand of 
cooperation. Actually, it is more likely that Asia will be a bipolar system and 
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might be more stable if the order of the system is only affected by these two 
great powers. However, in reality, China’s rise is constrained by another 
emerging power in Asia as well. With the economic potential, increasingly 
naval power and historical ties, it is likely that India will become the third 
candidate for great power status in Asia in the long term.  
India 
After World War II and especially in the aftermath of early disappointment 
in trying to unite ASEAN in the 1950s, India developed a non-aligned policy 
making the Indian military isolated from the outside world, including the 
Soviet Union. However, there has been a shift since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as India was facing economic 
challenges and threats of regional dominance coming from the rise of 
neighboring China. In the re-orientation of its foreign policy, India focused 
on promoting foreign investment and improving its military capabilities, 
especially naval power to constrain the Chinese naval expansion. In order to 
begin the process of economic and political reform, India decided to focus on 
the Southeast Asian region with the “Look East” policy that was launched 
from the mid-1990s and has matured in the last few years (Mohan, 2008). 
Apart from the economic element, India has other advantages including an 
increasingly capable Navy, large population and global and regional 
aspirations existing from history, compared with other states in the region. It 
is likely for India to be the third candidate for the regional great power 
position in the coming decades, along with the US and China.  
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Economic capabilities 
In fact, in past decades, India has been considered as the least important 
factor among major powers contributing to shaping the Asian order. 
Nevertheless, the recent re-emergence of India that has been marked by 
sustainable economic growth with around 8 percent rate per year during the 
first decade of the 21
st 
century has seemingly reduced the skepticism about 
its role in Asia’s security.  
India entered into economic reform focused on the liberalization of foreign 
investment in some keys areas; reforming the tax system and the delivery of 
subsidies since 1985. The process of economic liberalization pursued more 
vigorously since 1991 has brought about a significant success in India’s 
more competitive economy. As a result, economic growth has gradually 
increased over the past decades with 5.5% annual growth rates between 1985 
and 1990, 6.6% between 1992 and 1997 and up to 9.6% since 2002. The 
growth rate of the 2005-2008 period continuously rose over 9%. Real per 
capita income has increased at an average rate of around 4% during the 15 
year period from 1985 to 2000, and the incidence of poverty has declined 
from around 44% in mid-eighties to around 26%, while the life expectancy at 
birth has risen significantly from 48 years in 1985 to 64 years in 2000 
(Dholakia, 2001; Anh, 2011).  
As for purchasing power, India has jumped to fourth in the world behind the 
US, China and Japan. With a total gross domestic product estimated 1,235 
billion, India ranks 10
th
 in the world and third among Asian’s economies 
(Anh, 2011). Recently the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) published a report that said that around 2020, India 
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would probably surpass China to become the world’s biggest economy (The 
Indian Express, 2013).  
Population size 
There is also a fact that the gap between the poor and the rich, and the 
poverty rate due to the large population in India are still high. Therefore 
these problems need to be attacked as a main work of India’s rising economy 
in the future. Nonetheless, people who believe in India’s further economic 
potential assert that the potential for strong sustained growth of the Indian 
economy is still high due to its young population and high savings rate. As 
for population size, in the period of 1960-2000 India’s population rose from 
448 million to 1.04 billion – and to 1.21 billion in 2010 (Bloom, 
January/2011). The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) projection and United States Census Bureau 
estimate that India’s population will have reached 1.5 billion by 2025 and for 
the first time in history, India will surpass China to be the most populous 
country in the world (Roberts, 2009). As Virmani shows, “with per capital 
income/GDP almost  identical, the relative size of population is the primary 
determinant of relative economic of size. Thus over the medium –long term 
relative population is an important determinant of size” (Virmani, 2005, p.4). 
So, India’s relative power will inevitably rise over time, especially as India’s 
population will overcome China’s in coming decades. 
India’s population will enter the gold period with growth rate of a relatively 
young and working-age population exceeding that of total population (P.N. 
Mari Bhat, 2001). The dependency ratio of India’s population—the 
proportion of children and old people to working-age adults—is one of the 
best in the world and will remain so for a generation in the future in India. 
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Especially, the quality of population has been increased significantly since 
1950. For example, the infant and child mortality rate has fallen sharply with 
70/100 and 75/1000 respectively (Bloom, January/2011, p.7). Thus, the 
potential population and the increase in its quality will contribute effectively 
to the working productivity of the society (Dholakia, 2001; India's economy: 
India's surprising economic miracle, 2010).  
Military capabilities- Naval power 
India, “as an aspiring great power, has over the past decade put considerable 
resources in building up its military capabilities” (Bitzinger, 2011, p.32). In 
terms of military spending, India ranks as the world’s seventh biggest 
spender in 2012. Experts envisage that by 2020 India will have overtaken 
Japan, France and Britain to come in fourth of the world in military spending 
(India as a great power, 2013). In Asia, Indian military ranks as second, only 
behind China in terms of size (10 quân đội hùng mạnh nhất thế giới, 2013).  
Over the last five years, India has been the world’s largest weapon importer. 
In comparison with Japan, in spite of a US$ 13.2 billion bigger budget, 
Japan’s military expenditure fell 3.6 percent in the 2003-2012 period, while 
India’s military expenditure increased 65 percent in the same period. India’s 
defense budget has risen to $46.8 billion in 2013. This state currently has 
negotiated a $12 billion deal to buy 126 Rafale fighters from France and the 
deal is about to be successful. In addition, “India has a nuclear stockpile of 
80 or more warheads to which it could easily add more, and ballistic missiles 
that can deliver some of them to any point in Pakistan” (India as a great 
power, 2013). The state has recently tested a missile with a range of 5,000km 
(3,100 miles), which would reach most of China (India as a great power, 
2013; An do tang suc mang quan su doi pho voi Trung Quoc, 2013). 
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Apart from remaining an Army-heavy force oriented toward a ground war 
with Pakistan, the Indian military increasingly stresses long-range 
surveillance and intelligence, force projection, and expeditionary warfare 
that favors the Indian navy (IN) to take responsibility for a “constabulary 
role” in the Indian Ocean (Bitzinger, 2011, p.32). The goal of naval power 
build up is that by 2020 India plans to have a “160 plus-ship navy, including 
three aircraft carriers, 60 combatants, including submarines, and close to 400 
aircraft different types” (Ladwig, 2009, p. 91). In order to support for this 
objective, the Indian Navy’s share of total military budget went from 11.2 
percent in 1992–93 to 18.3 percent in 2007–08 (Ladwig, 2009, p. 91). India 
is among a few countries in the world and inevitably the only one in Asia 
Pacific so far to operate large sized aircraft carriers (Bitzinger, 2011, p. 32). 
If we compare this with the Chinese naval force, India’s Navy might be not 
better but in terms of working experience, like the US, the Indian’ Navy 
force is appreciated more experienced than that of China.  
India’s re-emerging influence and “Look East” policy 
After World War II, India tried to unite and consolidate Asia into a united 
region so-called the “Asian Federation”. This strategy was operated through 
an Asian Relations Conference (ARC) convened by the Prime Minister of 
the interim government, Jawaharal Nehru in Delhi in March 1947. However, 
the conference then failed due to other states’ skepticisms and worries on 
whether India and China at that time would pose threats of “Asiatic 
imperialism” (Mohan, 2008, p. 5 and Mohan, 2011). After the failure of this 
attempt at Asian unity and consolidation, India turned to a non-alignment 
strategy resulting in a weak Indian military and poor economy. Actually, 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, India realized its advantages and 
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disadvantages in terms of geopolitics as well as political and diplomatic 
opportunities. Thus, Indian leaders perceived that this state needs to reform 
its economy and the first regional initiative was towards Southeast Asia 
through the “Look East” policy4 (Mohan, 2008, p. 45). As India began to 
reorient the foreign policy, it is believed that promoting the economic and 
political relationships with states in Southeast Asia is only a step in the plan 
to resurface the aspiration “from Aden to Malacca” under the Raj time of 
British India that clearly manifested the aspiration to control littorals “from 
the Swahili coasts to the Persian Gulf and eastwards to the Straits of 
Malacca” (Ladwig, 2009, p. 90). In other words, the security of British 
commerce in the Far East and the trade routes to Australia and New Zealand 
all depend on India’s power (Ladwig, 2009; Mohan, 2008). It is also 
believed that this ambition re-emerged since about 1990s after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union as India tried to acquire an ambitious naval program as 
Defense Minister George Fernandes declared that India’s “area of interest... 
extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea” (Asia 
Times.com, 2000). Some Indian leaders have drawn a close connection 
between India’s maritime ambitions and its destiny as a great power. As 
former Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, commented, 
“after nearly a millennia of inward and landward focus, we are once again turning 
our gaze outwards and seawards, which is the natural direction of view for a nation seeking 
to re-establish itself, not simply as a continental power, but even more so as a maritime 
                                                     
4 In order to understand the “Look East” policy as well as the success of this policy, see Walter C. 
Ladwig III (2009): Delhi's Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, “Look East,” and India's Emerging 
Influence in the Asia-Pacific, Asian Security, 5:2, 87-113; see C. Raja Mohan (2008): India's 
Geopolitics and Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 43-60 (Article) and see C. Raja Mohan (2011): Great 
powers and Asia’s destiny:  A view from Delhi, CSS Discussion Paper 10/11, pp. 1-15.   
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power, and consequently as one that is of significance on the world stage” (Nizamani, 
2012).  
In order to realize its ambitions as a naval power, India has expanded not 
only economic relationships with Southeast Asian states but also enhanced 
military, especially naval, cooperation with these states. For example, for the 
first time in history, India convened an Indian Ocean naval conclave in 
February 2008 only with presence of states from South Africa  to Australia 
and excluded the US, China and Japan (Mohan, 2008, p. 7). In 2009, in his 
article, Ladwig admits that although “the Navy is unlikely to reach its 
ambitious goals before the mid-2020s, it already possesses the ability to 
conduct meaningful operations beyond the Indian Ocean” (Ladwig, 2009, p. 
93).  
Over the past almost 20 years, India has steadily expanded and strengthened 
its relationship with ASEAN in terms of economy, politics, diplomacy and 
security as well.  India’s re-emerging influence and the “Look East” policy 
mainly are driven not only by its geography, economics and history ties but 
also by the Chinese neighbor (Ladwig, 2009, p. 88). Before recently 
assertive actions from China such as claims of territorial sovereignty in 
Southeast Asia Sea and the Senkaku/Diafao dispute as well as the “string of 
pearls” strategy of China in the Indian Ocean and the provision of weapons 
to Pakistan, India suggests that China is projecting power into the Indian 
Ocean. Therefore, India’s Foreign Minister used to describe the rise of China 
as one of India’s foremost security challenges (Times of India, November 5, 
2008).  
In sum, India has the ambition to affirm its status as a great power in the 
region, especially the sea route in the Indian Ocean because of economic 
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interests and the geopolitics rivalry. As Alfred Thayer Mahan asserts, 
“whosoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. In the 21st century, 
the destiny of the world will be decided upon its waters” (quoted in Scott, 
2006, p. 109). This factor becomes more important as we look back in 
history to see that India desires autonomy and independence in implementing 
its foreign policy because of the memories of colonial rule for 200 years, 
defeat in the 1962 war and a realist approach after the Cold War due to the 
distribution of power leading to “self-help” strategy to protect its security 
(Sumit Ganguly & Manjeet S. Pardesi, 2009). Therefore, an increasing naval 
power like India might choose a balance of power instead of adopting a 
subsidiary role to other states, especially towards China, as the relationship 
between India and China still remains one of mistrust and misunderstanding 
(Mohan C. Raja, 2011, p. 5). It seems to be that with its increasing 
international clout, and economic and military capabilities, India would treat 
China as a peer to share the dominant role in the Asian region (Chris Elder, 
Robert Ayson, 2012).  
Japan 
Economic growth 
 
Although Japan used to be an economic great power in the late 1980s and 
considered as a new economic model, representing a pattern of so-called 
world capitalism in the future, its economy has dropped into serious 
recession. If we assess the power balance among China, Japan, the US and 
India, the trends are definitely not in Japan’s favor.  
  
57 
Japan has the third largest economy in the world, behind the US and China, 
but it reduced in size by 3.5 percent in 2012. Over the last 15 years, Japan 
has faced minus growth in two continuous quarters no less than five times. 
The economic recession of Japan has been expressed most clearly in terms of 
a reduction in exports, trade balances, current account and very heavy loss of 
big companies. In the late 1980s, Japanese stocks were the most expensive in 
the world but the majority of them were the result of a massive bubble in real 
estate and finance. That bubble burst, starting in 1990, and saw the Nikkei 
fall from 39,000 points to 9,000 points today (Chiến, 2012). The 2012 
surplus of the current account in Japan remained at a record low with -437.30 
billion JPY in January of 2012 (Tradingeconomics.com, 2012 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/current-account). As a proportion 
of its GDP, Japan has the highest debt ratios in the world. U.S. public debt is 
around 100% of GDP, Italy: 120%; Greece: 150%, while that of Japan is 
230%, more than the total debt of all 17 euro zone member states combined 
(Chiến, 2012 and Nguyet, 2013).  
Despite some faster growth in the early half of 2013 due to the “Abenomics” 
policy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with major policies including the 
monetary easing, financial flexibility, and private investment promoting 
(Nguyet, 2013), it is still too early to affirm success of this policy.  
Japan’s trade deficit still has continued for the 11th consecutive month with 
993.9 billion yen of last May, up 9.5% from the same period last year.  
Capital investment fell by 0.3% in the first quarter of 2013 compared to the 
last three months of 2012 (Tradingeconomics.com, 2013, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/balance-of-trade). 
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Military capabilities 
Japanese forces, including 225,000 permanent personnel, numbers 1/10
th
 that 
of China and a fifth of North Korea. Japan’s armed forces are equipped with 
modern weapons and expensive frigates mounted with the Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense system in response to missile launches by North Korea. As 
for its air force, Japan has 202 aircraft including F-15J DJ (157 and 45), 67 
F-4EJ, F-93 2А and В (62 and 31), and 13 RF-4EJ reconnaissance planes.  
The quality of its air force is likely to increase further because Japan is going 
to buy 42 F-35 interceptors from America. Furthermore, Japan has four 
helicopter-carrying destroyers, nine guided-missile destroyers, 34 destroyers, 
and 18 diesel-electric submarines. A large number of these ships (two of the 
guided-missile destroyers, 13 of the destroyers, and nine of the submarines) 
have entered service since 1995, making this a very modern force. In 
general, the Japanese Navy and the Chinese Navy rank the second and the 
third in the world, bettered only by the U.S. Navy. Japan could have a 
working nuclear weapons capability in one year should it decide to. Another 
common understanding is that Japan’s armed forces are better equipped, 
better trained, and more modern than the PLA (Jisi, 2010, p. 31). 
Realists have predicted that Japan will rearm to become a great power in its 
capabilities. In fact, before China’s more aggressive rise, the Japanese 
government had designs to gradually change investment in and exploration 
of military power, particularly after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to 
power for the first time in its history. In terms of defense expenditure, Japan 
already ranks high at the top five of the 15 countries with the highest military 
expenditure in 2011 (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2011 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/). In 2013 Japan’s defense budget 
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increased 0.8 percent to 4.68 trillion yen (US$ 51.7 billion) for the first time 
in 11 years.  The Coast Guard budget will go up 1.9 percent to 176.5 billion 
yen, its first expansion in six years (Reynolds, 2013). The official aim of 
increasing the defense budget is to serve regional stability. As Japan’s 
Defense Minister said: “We believe it is essential to build up a defense 
posture that will contribute to the enhancement of regional peace and 
stability. This is why the Japanese government has increased its defense 
budget for the … 2013 [fiscal year], the first time in 11 years, and also 
increased the number of SDF [Self Defense Forces] personnel for the first 
time in eight years,” (Sieff, 2013). Despite Japan’s potential military role 
however, the major military obstacle is the fact that Japan does not have 
power projection capabilities to become a “normal” great power.  
Firstly, under a pacifist constitution, the Japanese armed forces - also known 
as the Self-Defense Force (SDF) does not have its own aircraft carrier strike 
direction or long-range bombers (Umeda, Article 9, 2006). In addition, it has 
not been tested in battle because it has not participated in armed conflicts 
since its defeat in World War II (Linh, 2012). Secondly, Japan also faces a 
major political/legal obstacle. Since the defeat in 1945, Japan has been 
isolated by choosing a strictly defensive posture (Kang, 2003). In fact, 
Japan’s efforts in the 1980s to build a carrier were scrapped after political 
protests (N.D.Arora, 2010). Moreover, Japan also has a very strict no nuclear 
weapons policy. Being the only country which has suffered nuclear attacks, 
Japan has a self-imposed ban on possession of nuclear weapons and has 
become dependent on the American nuclear shield. When Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe came to power, his cabinet set up an attempt to revise Article 9 
in the Constitution of 1947 that “renounces war and prohibits Japan from 
maintaining the war potential” (Umeda, Article 9, 2006, p. 1 
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www.loc.gov/law/help/JapanArticle9.pdf ). Nevertheless, it will take a long 
time to achieve that goal which might not be approved by Japanese citizens 
in the foreseeable future (Kang, 2003). In addition, it is unlikely that Japan 
will soon give up the reassurance afforded by its military alliance with the 
US that has arguably been instrumental in preventing Japan going nuclear 
(Chris Elder, Robert Ayson, 2012). However, as Robert Jervis writes, 
“Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, 
new opportunities and dangers can arise” (Robert Jervis, 1978, p. 105). This 
view might apply to the case of Japan under the Shinzo Abe’s administrative. 
Nevertheless, if Japan wants to be a normal great power the dream was more 
realizable some decades ago when the Japanese economy enjoyed robust 
growth and Tokyo had many reasons to doubt the US commitment to its 
defense (Kang, 2003). At present, and in coming decades, the truth might be 
far from that wish due to economic decline. As Lam argues, Japan today is 
different from other great powers which wield both “hard” and “soft” power 
- it lacks the will and capability to exercise “hard power” (Lam, 2007, p. 
354).  
Soft power 
 
Since World War II, Japan has chosen soft power as one of the ways to 
expand its influence. Actually there are numerous reasons for Japan to 
develop soft power. First of all, after being defeated in World War II, Japan 
has not focused strictly on military ambitions due to “pacifist constitution 
and residual pacifism among Japanese” (Lam, 2007, p. 350). Instead it 
prioritized economic growth. Secondly, facing the return of the United States 
to Asia as well as the rise of China and these two powers’ increasing 
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influence in South East Asia, Japan has no other option than balancing 
against them with soft power strategies (Lam, 2007). 
 In fact, Japan has achieved several successes in terms of culture, official 
developmental aid and foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The country has 
developed and introduced numerous cultural products to the world in general 
and to South East Asia in particular. For example, Japan Cool is a concept 
about the attraction of Japan’s pop culture. With this concept, Japanese 
culture can be considered as a form of national power (McGray, 2001). Other 
traditional customs and values such as Karaoke, Sushi, manga (comics) and 
anime (cartoons) are welcomed and easily accepted in Southeast Asian 
countries (Lam, 2007). Since 1974 Japan has organized and sponsored the 
Ship for Southeast Asia Youth Exchange Program. The Program includes 
around 400 members, who are youth representatives from Japan and ten 
countries in Southeast Asia, participating in exchange activities on a ship 
from Japan to five destinations around the region. This program has indeed 
contributed effectively to the promotion of friendship between Japan and 
Southeast Asian countries.  
In terms of official developmental assistance, the Japanese government is the 
second largest aid donor in the world. To Japan, Official Development Aid 
(in the form of grants and loan aid) assists the purpose of promoting 
economic development, strengthening economic interdependence and 
maintaining political stability (Hook, 2011). And regarding foreign policy, 
the Fukuda Doctrine has been the official blueprint to Japan’s foreign policy 
towards Southeast Asia since 1977 (Lam, 2012).  
Japan’s soft power also has its limits, “lacking a CNN or BBC-like 
institution to project its voice globally” (Lam, 2007), and having a shrinking 
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population and resistance to immigration (Nye, 2005). In addition, “Japanese 
is not a global language” (Nye, 2005). According to one author, “Japan's 
meager English-language skills make it difficult to attract international talent 
to its universities and Japan does not represent any universal values and 
ideals while certain Western nations, especially the US, champion human 
rights and democracy” (Lam, 2007). Finally and not least, while Japan is 
considered as a soft power state in eyes of American and Asian states, it 
lacks soft power towards China and South Korea due to historical problems 
and territorial disputes (Lam, 2007, p.360 and Nye, 2005).  
Conclusion 
 
In looking ahead at the evolving power balance among China, the US, India 
and Japan over the next years, it seems to be that China’s power and 
international clout will continue rise rapidly; the US’ capabilities will have 
remained powerful enough to take part in leading the Asian region; whereas 
Indian economic potential development supported by the gold population 
will help this state build up its great power status in this region. However, 
Japan’s capabilities will be limited due to its economy, pacifist Constitution 
and the US’ security assurance to become a normal great power.  
As for China, despite some objections from neighbor states, in terms of 
economic interests, it is difficult for other states, especially states in 
Southeast Asia relating to territorial disputes with China to turn their back on 
the economic opportunities China brings for them. Meanwhile, instead of 
dealing with the impact of China’s rise, it is prudent for other Southeast 
Asian states to welcome the presence of the USA as a counterbalancing 
influence. Along with its economic interests, that is main reason why the US 
  
63 
will not withdraw from the region in the foreseeable future to ensure its 
political goals and will continuously be considered as the extra-balancer in 
Asia.  
In comparison with Japan, India seems to be still growing economically. 
Indian economic growth has increased steadily over the past years and there 
is no sign of it stopping. Moreover, India is predicted to overtake the US and 
China as well to become the biggest economy in the coming decades. In 
contrast to this, Japan’s economy has expressed signs of slowing down. In 
general, economic experts predict that it will be hard for Japan to recover its 
economic position in coming years (Singh, 2012; World Economic Situation 
and Prospects 2013, 2013; and World Economic outlook, 2012). Virmani 
shows that “Japan has passed the peak of its potential power and will be on a 
declining trend over this century. Its power potential has already fallen below 
that of China and will fall below that of India within the next 20 years” 
(Virmani, 2005, p. 15-16). As William H. Overt argues, Japan’s unique 
economic model created the country’s economic miracle but has led Japan to 
the edge of collapse (William H. Overholt, 2002).  
Furthermore, India has more advantages than China and Japan in terms of 
population size which is a necessity for further economic development. In 
comparison, India’s population is entering a golden period with a young and 
growing workforce while Japan’s is declining and aging quickly; and 
China’s will shortly start aging because of its one-child policy.  
China’s population is aging faster than any state in the world. Accordingly, it 
is estimated that by 2050, the ratio of the percentage of the population over 
the age of 65 years in China will be more than 15 percent leading to a lack of 
pension coverage, the so-called “4:2:1” phenomenon. The concept means 
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that increasing numbers of couples will be solely responsible for the care of 
one child and four parents in China within the next decades (Hesketh, T. and 
Lu, L. and Xing, Z.W, 2005). Another study proves that by 2050, about 430 
million people - accounting for one third of the population - will be retired. 
The ratio of workers in comparison with that of retirees decreased rapidly, 
from 10/1 in 1990 to 6/1 in 2000 and will be 2/1 in 2040 (Trung Quốc: Dân 
số già và những hệ quả tất yếu, 2007). Population aging therefore will lead to 
a series of issues affecting and threatening the Chinese economy such as the 
supply of working force and the need to balance the basic human rights of 
reproduction with population growth - especially as China is considered as a 
manufacturing center and a supply of cheap and abundant labor (Hesketh, T. 
and Lu, L. and Xing, Z.W, 2005).  
Japan’s population dropped by around 284,000 in the 1950s to an estimated 
127.5 million by October of 2012 with around 24 percent aged 65 or over 
and only 13 percent aged 14 or under. Japan is one of the fastest aging 
nations in the developed countries (Demetriou, 2013). This aging population 
inevitably will impact on the economic productivity in coming years in Japan 
whereas India’s potential economy and good age population will be able to 
favor Indian great power status in the foreseeable future.  
Compared with India, it is difficult for Japan to overcome its current and 
historical challenges to become a normal great power. Apart from the 
economic and aging population issues, Japan has to face the pacifist 
Constitution and its dependence on US military assurance. Recently, the US 
has reaffirmed its assurance towards Japan under the bilateral security treaty 
between the US and Japan (Vietnamplus, 2013). In addition, in Defense 
White Paper 2013 published in July, while emphasizing China’s challenges, 
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Japan also stressed and highly appreciated the US-Japan alliance’s key role 
in ensuring regional security and stability (Vietnamplus, 2013). These events 
partly show the fact that it is difficult or at least will take a very long time for 
Japan to escape the US’ security asurance and not be dependent on the US.  
In sum, despite some economic progress since Shinzo Abe came to power, it 
is too early to say that the Japanese economy is recovering 
(TradingEconomics.com, 2013, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/japan/report) and that is the key factor 
contributing to overall development of a state. So, the chances of Japan 
becoming a normal great power, as argued earlier, will be limited due to its 
economy, pacifist Constitution and the US’ security assurance. As a result, it 
is more likely to envisage that Asia will be dominated by three leading 
powers including China, the US and India, instead of four leading powers 
including Japan.  
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CHAPTER THREE: MULTIPOLARITY AND 
STABILITY IN ASIA  
 
In this chapter, I would like to discuss how multipolarity will affect stability 
in the Asian region. In other words, if the Asian region becomes more 
multipolar, will it become more stable or unstable?  
A more multipolar Asia might be driven mainly by China’s rise and the 
dominance of other major powers including the US and India in the next 
twenty or thirty years. By that time, China will be the strongest power and 
India might be the weakest one, and the size of the combination between the 
US and India will be larger than that of China (Virmani, 2005). The 
implications for Asia’s future of this shift are not certain however.  
As mentioned in chapter one, the term stability refers to two factors 
including (1) war/conflict avoidance and harm avoidance and (2) obtaining 
and returning to the equilibrium of the system. To examine the stability of 
the Asia-Pacific, Robert Ayson also offered five types of stability as follows: 
(1) the avoidance of major war; (2) the stability of the distribution of power; 
(3) the stability of institutions and norms; (4) political stability within 
countries; and (5) economic stability.  
In my opinion, the issues being addressed in this thesis are related to the 
relations between multipolarity and its effects on the stability of the system. 
This means that to consider the stability of the region in the context of Asian 
multipolarity, we should take into consideration the most relevant factors 
influencing the establishment of the model. In other words, how the increase 
in the number of major actors in the multipolar model compared to the 
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bipolar and unipolar models can affect Asian stability. In balance of power 
theory, the multipolar system can lead to competition and even wars between 
great powers due to the alignment of some great powers against the others. 
That is one of the reasons why most scholars only focus on estimating the 
likelihood of major great powers’ wars to measure the Asian stability. Under 
this logic, I have decided to examine the avoidance of great power wars in 
Asia as the first element to measure the stability of the system.  
However, the likelihood of the great powers’ war can be controlled or 
limited by other factors in the process of measuring stability. In other words, 
this variable is insufficient to measure the duality of the system relating to 
how states can check and balance each other, and especially how long the 
stability will last that might be associated with the legitimacy of great 
powers. This examination allows us to understand that if the Asia region is 
more multipolar, will the transition from the unipolar system after the Cold 
War, and bipolarity (now) into the multipolar system be smooth or 
disrupted? Answering this question will help to prove whether the durability 
of the distribution of power in a multipolar Asia that is associated with the 
likelihood of war exists or not (Ayson, 2005, p. 197). Therefore, in order to 
make clear these characteristics, I will take the stability of the distribution of 
power into consideration in checking the prospects for obtaining and 
maintaining the equilibrium of the system.  
In sum, under the above logic, I have decided to examine two variables 
including great power’s war avoidance and a stable distribution of power in 
the context of a multipolar Asia.  
  
68 
The likelihood of war avoidance by the great powers 
In theory, multipolarity can easily lead to the alignment of state-actors 
against each other. The more great powers there are, the more potential 
conflict dyads and miscalculations there are. The reason is that in this model, 
there are many more relationships than in the bipolar model. The interests of 
states can overlap and intertwine within different dyads. Therefore, in order 
to ensure their interests, states have more options to make friends or alliances 
with others. They are free to go around and choose others to align with. As a 
result, it is more difficult for states to believe in other partners due to 
suspicion and misunderstanding. 
In a multipolar Asia, there will be relations between dyads including the US-
China, China- India, and the US-India. I argue that wars are not certain 
between these states in the Asian multipolar system dominated by China, the 
US and India because of increasing economic interdependence and 
calculations of states’ national interests.   
The US- China dyad: a mix of competition and cooperation 
In regards to the US – China dyad, it is difficult for a war to develop between 
these two great powers. Clearly, the relationship between China and the US 
is a complicated one of increasing and established powers reflected in terms 
of economic, political and diplomatic interactions. Generally speaking, this 
involves a mix of cooperation and competition (Friedberg, 2000b).  
 
In terms of historical evidence, these two great powers are in contention for 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and South China Sea’s territorial integrity and national 
sovereignty; Tibet’s human rights; and other domestic and international 
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issues’ tensions such as the US-Japan traditional alliances, the North Korea 
crisis and the freedom of navigation issues.  
 
Firstly, China regards Taiwan and Tibet as part of China whereas on the one 
hand, the US recognizes one China, but on the other hand, the US has been 
willing to give military aid to Taiwan aiming at preventing China’s forceful 
reunification. Therefore, in China’s view, this support prevents unification of 
Taiwan into the mainland. As for the Tibetan issue, the US ceased financial 
support for the Dalai Lama in 1971. Nonetheless, the relationship has been 
rekindled since 1980s as Tibet became a human rights concerns (Oksenberg, 
1997). However, these differences have not become main reasons for 
competition between the US and China. In fact, American support of Japan 
and the freedom of international navigation issues are more difficult for the 
US-China relationship. 
 
American support of Japan as well as military ties between these two states 
has raised suspicions in China. China and Japan have an ongoing territorial 
dispute on Senkaku/Diafao which has been increasing in tension in recent 
times. Supported by assurance from the US, Japan sees Washington as a 
strong tool to contain China. In the meantime, the US considers Japan as the 
most loyal ally in Asia to face challenges in the Pacific-Asian region as US’ 
influence declines in the region. The US and Japan see the North Korean 
threat and the growing Chinese military presence in the region as common 
challenges. As Viktor Pavliatenko believed that  “The USA wants to 
strengthen this alliance. As Hillary Clinton said recently, “we have returned 
to the Asia-Pacific Region to stay”. The USA has lost much of its clout in the 
region because of China. The USA is trying to develop relations with the 
ASEAN but this association has its own relations with China. Japan remains 
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the US’ most reliable partner.” (Quoted in The USA and Japan intend to drill 
China, The Voice of Russia, July 18
th
, 2011). In fact, the deepening of 
operational cooperation and capabilities in the US-Japan alliance and their 
commitments to cooperate on missile defense in the region under the US-
Japan mutual security treaty has worried China. So, Chinese media recently 
have raised questions about exercises between the US and Japan. It is true 
that the US-Japan relationship creates difficulties for China (Gui Yongtao, 
2010).   
 
The third confrontation between the US and China lies in views of freedom 
of international and regional navigation. Since 2010, the US has always 
affirmed its interests in the South China Sea in ensuring the freedom of 
navigation and so has objected to any coercion, threat or use of force to 
enforce claims in the South China Sea. The U.S. is not involved in the 
territorial claims and sovereignty in the South China Sea but is very 
interested in resolving disputes in this matter. Accordingly, US leaders have 
emphasized that any claims must always rely on international law, including 
the International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as well as 
characteristics of soil, rocks and islands (Quỳnh, 2013). Recently, in bilateral 
strategic dialogue in Washington in July 2013, US President Barack Obama 
reminded China to resolve territorial disputes in sea and islands with 
neighbor states peacefully (LaoDong online, 2013). In contrast to the US, 
China asserts that the US has intervened in regional disputes and accuses the 
US of enhancing cooperation with other claimant states. In the Chinese view, 
the US should not intervene in these disputes and should not tilt towards any 
side (Nguyen, 2013).   
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In sum, in spite of efforts coming from both countries over the past decades, 
the different perspectives of these issues have raised mistrust and 
misunderstanding for both. In China’s view, the US pivot policy in Asia is an 
effort to slowdown its development and to contain it. Furthermore, China 
asserts that the US should not intervene in its domestic and regional affairs. 
Meanwhile the reemergence of China is assessed as a threat to the 
hegemonic position of the US due to the US’ relative decline. However, it 
seems unlikely that the US will dominate China by using military force and 
it is not easy for China to trigger any wars because of the increasing 
economic interdependence of both states.  
 
In terms of economic interdependence, the US and China have achieved 
remarkable outcomes in trade exchange over time. In the period between 
2000 and 2007, US exports to China increased by 301%. Two-way trade 
grew 180-fold from $2.4 billion in 1979 to $446.64 billion in 2011. The most 
important point here is that both states are the second biggest partners of 
each other (Hien tai va tuong lai cua quan he Trung My, 
Nghiencuubiendong.vn, 2012). China is the world’s second biggest economy 
behind the US but currently holds upwards of $ 1.1 trillion in US debt. Given 
such a situation, it seems to hold that “China gains greatly from its economic 
relationship with the US, but arguably the dependence of the US on China is 
greater” (McDougall, 2012, p. 7). At the same time, Chinese leaders also 
perceive a weakness in that the Chinese economy is now so dependent on 
external resources it might be unsustainable to the point in Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s words of being "unbalanced, unstable, uncoordinated, and 
unsustainable" (Beckley, 2011, pp. 61-73; Chang, 2012; Ian Bremmer and 
Evan A. Feigenbaum, 2011). In the case of any war occurring between the 
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two great powers, both states will be damaged economically due to economic 
disruption as the theory of economic interdependence assumes (The US-
China business Council, 2009; Clinton, 2011; Lu, 2001; Barbieri, February 
1996). This economic interdependence between the two great powers raises 
the high cost of armed conflicts and so reduces benefits so much. The recent 
meeting between President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping 
which took place in June 2013 seems to show that both rising and established 
powers do not want to have destructive conflicts and they wish for more 
positive cooperation in the future (Toàn cảnh thế giới, VTV1, 6.9.2013).  
This is a reminder of the fact that a world dominated by the US and China 
supports the stability of the Asian system.  However, the problem is that in 
the case of a bigger India in the future, what is likely to happen to the US-
China relationship? India might be a major state playing a very important 
role in the balance of power in multipolar Asia, and could be considered as a 
key actor. Therefore, Sino-Indian relations will play a critical role in 
ensuring peace and stability in Asia in the coming decades. How then can the 
US and China work to maintain the balance of power? How will India 
respond to the US and China’s strategies to protect its national interests and 
great power status in the region? In fact, the likelihood of war between these 
two countries will be hard to estimate. In my opinion, in the case of a bigger 
India, there will be at least two scenarios for the relations between the major 
states due to India’s presence.  
 
 
 
  
73 
The US-India alliance and potential China-India conflict  
Some argue (Rosecrance, 1966; Mearsheimer 1990) that multipolarity 
increases opportunities for states to group and align together to prevent the 
dominance of a potential actor or to ensure states’ interests. And of course, 
this combination can lead to consequences that are more difficult to calculate 
than in bipolarity. Without India’s presence, the world would be bipolar and 
it will favor peacefulness by the balance of power between the US and 
China. Nevertheless, this balance of power might disappear in a more 
multipolar Asia as the US aligns with India against China.  
We know that US and China relations are between a rising and an 
established power. In the words of the American political scientist Mike 
Lampton, this relationship gives rise to an image of “same beds, different 
dreams” (David M. Lampton, 2001). Originally, the US does not want to live 
with any peer competitor. In the wake of the Cold War, US policymakers 
remain firmly committed to this goal. “Our first objective is to prevent the 
reemergence of a new rival...that poses a threat on the order of that posed 
formerly by the Soviet Union....Our strategy must now refocus on precluding 
the emergence of any potential future global competitor” (Mearsheimer J. J., 
2001, p. 46). In March 2012 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also said 
diplomatically: “The US is attempting to work with a rising power to foster 
its rise as an active contributor to global security, stability and prosperity 
while also sustaining and securing American leadership in a changing 
world...This is uncharted territory. And we have to get it right, because so 
much depends on it” (Quoted in Chris Elder, Robert Ayson, 2012). 
Therefore, the US does not want to create chances for China to become a 
super power and replace its sole dominance whereas China always thinks 
that the US and other states want to slow down its development. As Aaron 
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Friedberg argues, recognizing the growing threat to its position, a dominant 
power (or coalition of status quo powers) may attempt to use force 
preventively to destroy a rising state before it can achieve its full potential 
(Friedberg, Autumn, 2005). In contrast to this prediction, however, I argue 
that the US will not withdraw from this region but also not use force to deal 
with China in coming years. Instead of doing so, the US will move to contain 
China’s threat (White, 2012 and Mearsheimer J. J., 2001) by the policy of 
alignment with India, an increasing power in the region, to balance with 
China as it has tried to do over the past years.  
 
Hence, if India accepts this strategy of the US (which also means India will 
become an ally of the US), China will face the combined strength of “an 
eagle and an elephant” (Virmani, 2005). In response to this alignment, China 
might choose to take actions causing instability for the region. This estimate 
is based on the characteristics of China, a state with increasing nationalism 
(Shambaugh, Winter 2011, p. 22). Realists in international relations, who are 
the dominant group in China and China’s global role today, (if not forever) 
urges China use its newly-built military, economic, and diplomatic influence 
to essentially coerce others toward the ends China desires. Offensive realists 
believe that power is worth little if it is not used while defensive realists 
argue that China should possess strong military might, but should “keep its 
powder dry” and use it essentially to deter aggression and Taiwanese 
interdependence (Shambaugh, Winter 2011, p. 12). More particularly, China 
has become more confident and proud of its economic reform and overall 
development, its so-called Beijing Consensus (Grant, 2010) over the past 
decades. Therefore, in the Chinese mind, the West should be aware of its 
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remarkable economic success and should consider applying the Beijing 
Consensus rather than the Washington one.  
China may feel constrained and beset by the idea that the alignment of the 
US and India creates the counter-balancing of China. Not surprisingly, 
Beijing views the increasing U.S– India partnership as evidence of a growing 
attempt to contain China’s rise. The reconciliation of China towards India 
was reflected in China’s recognition of Sikkim as part of India and the 
establishment of direct air links between 2002 and 2004 (Indian Express, 
2004). However, before the improvement in Indo-US relations after 2005, 
China responded with negative actions such as blocking India’s EAS 
membership and reasserting its claim on Arunachal Pradesh (Jo Johnson and 
Richard McGregor, 2007). In 2009, China continuously complained to New 
Delhi about the visits of the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and the 
Dalai Lama, the Tibetans’ spiritual leader to Arunachal Pradesh. 
Furthermore, China delayed Asian Development Bank loans to India because 
some of them would go to Arunachal Pradesh, and it also tried to delay 
World Bank loans (Grant, 2010, p. 2). Consequently, if the US and India 
align with each other, Asia’s future might be more unstable due to critical 
responses and even overconfidence to affirm Chinese nationalism and 
strength in the foreseeable future. 
India and China: Cooperation and Coexistence 
The second striking consideration however might be that despite the US’ 
efforts to turn an alignment policy with India into reality, India will not 
heavily rely on the US due to India’s traditional autonomy and 
independence; and its own economic development and security demands. 
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Apart from these factors, increasing ties between China and India also 
contribute to a partly stable and peaceful environment in Asia.  
First of all, history has witnessed India’s very high levels of autonomy and 
interdependence. This view was also expressed through the wish of Asian 
unity and solidarity reflected in the foreign policy of India and newly 
liberated countries in Asia after the end of the Second World War (Mohan, 
2011). Unfortunately, this Asian unity aspiration was not successful and 
India had to move to a non-alignment policy. Besides this characteristic, 
India looked to be supported by other great powers such as the US to keep 
the balance of power with other states that reflected its autonomy and 
interdependence. According to Mohan, these events reflect Asian countries’ 
features in general and India in particular. Facing obstacles from the outside, 
they tend to favour a balance of power, and as they become stronger, they 
might emphasize their own independent role more than accept subordinate 
positions to other great powers (Mohan, 2011). Thus, if India becomes 
bigger, this state might not accept the alignment policy and depend on the 
US. If this is correct, the alignment favoring conflicts and wars in the 
multipolar model will be less likely to operate as realists argue.  
Secondly India also has a complex relationship with China. Both states 
“share a range of interests and challenges which may, over time, serve as a 
foundation for greater cooperation, compromise and policy alignment” (Rory 
Medcalf; Ashley Townshend, 2010, p. 3). Despite territorial disputes, in 
reality, Indian and Chinese strategic policy aims at the maintenance of a 
stable international environment to support long-term economic development 
and both have increased trade and security cooperation and global 
governance share over the past decades. In 2008, China overtook the United 
States to become India’s largest trading partner. The two states set a bilateral 
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trade target of U.S. $100 billion by 2015 (Toàn cảnh thế giới, VTV1, 
26.5.2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1gJhleyI3Gk). So in the short 
term India will pursue a two-pronged strategy trying to avoid a serious 
confrontation with China and developing a set of alliances and relationships 
that will reduce the potential threat from China. As in the words of one 
Indian government official: “The best response to the rise of China is the rise 
of India” (Grant, 2010).  
In sum, Indians do not want to be part of an American strategy for containing 
China, and parts of the intelligentsia remain instinctively anti-American. But 
most of the political elite see the link with the US as an important insurance 
policy against China (Grant, 2010). 
The US-India-China triangle: Unpredictable conflicts due to security 
dilemmas  
However, it is still possible that in the case of a more aggressive China, India 
might not stay calm forever. The economic interdependence between two 
giants might be insufficient to ensure the avoidance of conflict or war 
between India and China. Rehman argues that “the idea of trade being 
conductive to peace is an old one” which may be “doomed to failure on 
several counts” (Rehman, 2009, p. 115). In reality, both countries have made 
surface improvements but deep-rooted conflicts remain. Sino-Indian 
relations are thus still potentially prone to conflict, despite all efforts at 
normalization.  
First of all, the relations between two states still remain characterised by 
mistrust and misunderstanding. As for China, the likelihood of going to war 
with India is contained by concerns related to an Indo-US alliance. China 
perceives that the alignment between India and the US will be a threat 
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towards her security (Rory Medcalf; Ashley Townshend, 2010). Hence, 
China will be wary of any actions and decisions in Washington and India’s 
partnership with the US. Similarly, there is an Indian concern that if China 
wants to improve Sino-Indian relations, she must stop supporting Pakistan 
(Rory Medcalf; Ashley Townshend, 2010, p. 21). India suspects China’s 
military and financial support for Pakistan, which is a rival of India, is 
designed to project Chinese power and counter India in South Asia (Rehman, 
2009, p. 117). In order to counter-contain an Indo-US alignment, China has 
promoted its relations with India’s neighbors, especially Pakistan. More 
importantly, China has become the most reliable economic partner and arms 
supplier to Islamabad over many years. It actively assisted Pakistan with its 
nuclear program form the late 1980s towards. Furthermore, China developed 
infrastructure projects in Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka. The most important of 
these was the construction of a deep-sea port in Gwardar in Pakistan 
(Rehman, 2009, p. 118). In sum, although China always denies increasing 
ties in relations between China and Pakistan, for India “Pakistan is not and 
cannot be a threat without China’s support just as Taiwan cannot constitute a 
threat to China without America’s support” (Mohan Malik, “India and 
China,” p.135) and China’s relationship with Pakistan is therefore defined by 
“far more...than just a common hostility towards India” (Quoted by Rehman, 
2009, p.119).  
The mistrust and misunderstanding here are increased by the long-
unresolved territorial disputes over Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin (Rory 
Medcalf; Ashley Townshend, 2010). Thus, not surprisingly, both states have 
sought to exclude other’s presence in EAS, IONS, Kunming Initiative or the 
MeKong-Ganga Cooperation Project or MGC to diminish each other’s 
reputation and influence in regional and international forums and 
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organizations. China wants to take advantage of Pakistan as a threat to 
India’s rise in South Asia, and India entered into an Indo-US strategic 
partnership and pursued a Look East Policy leading to skepticism by China. 
The evidence shows that China “has engaged in a policy of containment of 
India” and India might not align with the US against China but it might 
choose to “back its policy of engagement of Beijing with a form of counter-
containment” (Rehman, 2009, p. 114). Actually, Ch’ien-peng Chung also 
argues that “even if the territorial dispute were resolved, India and China 
would still retain a competitive relationship in the Asia-Pacific region, being 
as they are, two Asiatic giants aspiring to Great Power status” (Quoted in 
Scott, 2008, p.263). Consequently, facing this mistrust and misunderstanding 
as well as their own ambitions, both states might adopt uncontrolled actions 
or behaviors causing negative responses from the other side that might lead 
to the escalation of war, or at least continuing conflicts on the borders of 
these two giants in Asia.  
In summary, great power wars seem less likely and might be prevented in 
terms of alignment between major states (the balance of power). 
Nevertheless, there are likely to remain potential conflicts between great 
powers if we consider the situation in other approaches. For example, 
China’s war against Vietnam or Indonesia’s violent 1975 annexation of East 
Timor can give other answers on stability and instability from avoidance of 
armed violence of these conflicts (Robert Ayson, p. 196, 2005). Therefore, 
we need to examine the other factor (the stability of distribution of power) to 
check whether a more multipolar Asia will be stable or not.  
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The stability of the distribution of power 
The distribution of power is at the core of realism which refers to the balance 
of power and the struggle for survival, and the national interests of states in 
anarchical systems (Mearsheimer, 2008 and Jackson, R. , Sorense, G., 2001).  
In order to examine this element, I will examine two factors including (1) the 
checks and balances between major states and (2) the legitimacy of major 
powers. 
 
The checks and balances between major states  
 
First of all, the stability of the Asian distribution of power is mainly affected 
by China’s and India’s re-emergence as great players. On the one hand, from 
its sole super power and hegemon status since the Cold War, the US role has 
changed in part on the international and regional stage due to the role of 
these emerging states. In the context of China’s rise, the US is often 
considered as an extra-balancer in Asia by America’s own view itself and by 
the approach of other states such as the Southeast Asia countries towards  
China’s rise. With its presence in the region, the US can check and prevent 
China from becoming a regional hegemon, a point that is explained by its 
three goals in Asia including “prevent the rise of a regional hegemon, 
maintain stability and manage Asia’s transformation” (The United States and 
Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture, 2001).  
 
Faced with China’s rise in terms of rapidly a increasing economy and 
expanded military, in tandem with its relative decline, the US cannot force 
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China to give up her aspiration to dominate Asia, so the US has to have a 
smarter option that means it should retain its presence in Asia to maintain  its 
role and constrain China’s influence in the region (White, 2012). At least, the 
US presence in Asia might help to avoid chaos caused by regional great 
power competition and encourage China to be reserved in exercising its 
regional and global aspirations (White, 2012 and Hillary Clinton, 2011).   
 
Although the US always denies its pivot strategy is aimed at the containment 
of China, its actions and behaviors in Asia are clearly designed to cope with 
China’s rise. In order to rebalance China’s rise, the Obama Administration 
announced that the Asia-Pacific region was a "top priority" of US security 
policy encompassing a plan that by 2020 about 60% the US fleet would be 
deployed in the region (Leon Panetta: US to deploy 60% of navy fleet to 
Pacific, BBC news, June 2th 2012). Furthermore, the US is renewing and 
strengthening traditional alliances and simultaneously establishing new 
strategic partners with states in Asia (Goh, Winter 2007-2008). The US has 
enhanced exercises with Japan, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam and 
even Myanmar. In Southeast Asia, the US entered the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC), which China reached in 2003, with ASEAN in Thailand 
in 2009. By acceding to the TAC, the US was accepted by ASEAN to join 
the East Asia Summit and to participate in the ASEAN Defense Ministers 
Meeting aming at resolving regional issues. The speech of Defense Secretary 
Chuck Hagel at the 12th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
Asia Security Summit: The Shangri-La Dialogue, in Singapore June 1, 2013 
recently reaffirmed “the US’ pivot in Asia despite budget constraints at home 
noting the United States represented 40 percent of global defense spending 
even under the "most extreme budget scenarios" and assured allies and 
partners that "It would be unwise and short-sighted to conclude ... that our 
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commitment to the rebalance cannot be sustained" (US rebalance to Asia-
Pacific gaining steam, Pentagon chief says, Reuters, June 1
st
, 2013).  
 
In particular the US has tried to ally with India to counter-contain China to 
reduce China’s influence in Asia (Mohan, 2006). In the past, the US imposed 
sanctions on India due to its nuclear program. However as India becomes a 
nuclear power in the region, the US started to side with India marked by a 
nuclear cooperation deal in 2005 that upset China and Pakistan (Grant, 2010 
and Rehman, 2009). In US strategy, the US will help India to reduce the 
economic and technological gap between India and China which helps India 
become a stronger pole in Asia, and keep a balance with China (Virmani, 
2005 and Mohan, 2006). Rehman also asserts that “India has thus required a 
new importance as a counterweight to China in the Asian theater, providing 
the triangular relationship between the US, China, and India with a form of 
strategic salience it never had in the past” (Rehman, 2009, p. 126). The 
above actions show that the US wants to ally with states in the region to 
contain China’s military power and express its willingness to translate a 
potential alliance with India into reality.  
 
For China, a stable distribution of power means that the world in general and 
Asia in particular should be a multipolar system and China’s role in 
international and regional stages should be recognized that it will advocate 
the peace and the stability in the long term (Ayson, 2005, p. 198). Power 
balancing in the Chinese view favors the idea that it should not support US’ 
hegemony as over the past decades. That is why Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao said at a meeting with visiting U.S. President Barack Obama that 
“China pursues the independent foreign policy of peace and will not align 
with any country or country blocks and global issues should decided by all 
  
83 
nations in the world, rather than one or two countries” (Chinadaily.com.cn, 
11.18.2009). Then, given this assumption, the stable distribution of power 
will involve a transition in the regional system from unipolarity to 
multipolarity. As a result, on one hand, China has enhanced relations with 
India. On the other hand, China has not stopped supporting Pakistan with 
military weapons and finance, a main rival of India, to counter the likelihood 
of the US-India alliances. As Rehman argues, “Beijing’s efforts to assist 
Pakistan as a peer competition to India in South Asia show that despite 
certain improvement in Sino-Indian relations, Beijing remains subject to 
realist balance-of-power considerations in its dealings with its neighbor” 
(Rehman, 2009, p. 119).  
 
India has become an important swing player in the evolving international 
system and in its dealings with both China and the US (Mohan, 2006; Scott, 
2008, p. 263 and Rehman, 2009). Among three major powers, it seems that 
India has the most abilities to align or tilt any other significant powers 
against or counter another competitor to benefit. That is why India started to 
have good relations with the US as the US declared India “a major non-
NATO ally” and the highest point of the warmth of Indo-US ties was a 
landmark nuclear deal
5
. Furthermore, India has implemented the Look East 
policy with extended-neighbor states to improve the balance of power with 
                                                     
5 To understand India’s increased rapprochement with the US, see Rehman, India’s counter-
Containment of China in Asia, 2009. For example, when George W. Bush came to power, India 
offered the US the use of its airfields in its strike against Afghanistan and allegedly provided 
intelligence which led to the destruction of several al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and 
especially the highest point in a landmark nuclear deal. Both countries signed a framework defense 
agreement in June 2005 on a ten-year program of increased defense cooperation. The US offered to 
supply the Indian Air Force with F-16s and F-18s and allowed Israel to sell India three Phalcon 
AWACs or Airborne Warning Aircraft whilst it refused to do in the case of China. India and the US 
have held military exercises.  
  
84 
China’s threat (Rehman, 2009, p. 127) and there are also signs of Southeast 
Asian countries welcoming India as a counter weight to China’s influence 
(Acharya, 2003/2004).  
 
Despite such a countermove, the evolution of Sino-India ties has been 
promoted over the past decade. In April 2005, India and China announced a 
“strategic partnership” (Mohan, 2006, p. 21). Consequently, China is likely 
to be prepared to make some concessions to India, and try to get India to 
instead balance with itself against US preeminence in the international 
system (Scott, 2008, p. 263). However, the problem is that it is uncertain 
whether India will become the US’s “Asian Israel” due to the tradition of a 
fiercely independent foreign policy (Rehman, 2009, p. 129). At that time, 
Mohan argued that this approach might misunderstand India’s non-alignment 
policy as well as the nature of India’s realpolitik over the past 60 years, 
because India has not had difficulty entering into alliances when its interests 
so demand (Mohan, 2006, p.25).  
 
In fact, although denying encirclement as characterizing their own policies, 
both India and China have used other types of power balancing including so-
called soft balancing and internal balancing to deal with each other (Scott, 
2008, p. 243-248). India does not want to follow the US’ strategy explicitly 
and China cannot encircle India completely, but both states established good 
relations with other states who are rivals of the other one to balance with 
each other. For example, India has had ongoing good relations with the US 
and Southeast Asian states and China has had good relations with Pakistan 
and India’s neighbors.  
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Clearly the US and China, and also India, have different definitions of 
stability in the region. Thus, will the shift from the existing distribution of 
power into a new one satisfy all states in the system or not? Or in other 
words, does this shift ensure checks and balances between major states to 
avoid armed conflicts or hegemony? Actually, the US will rely on India and 
Southeast Asian countries to develop a counter-balance of China. The 
Southeast Asian countries have shown signs of welcoming the US and 
India’s presence in the region to balance China. For its part, China has 
established relations with India’s neighbors such as Pakistan and maintained 
the relations with North Korea to counter with India and the US. In reality, 
India also might not travel alone in the road of shaping the new order in Asia 
to affirm its great power status. Hence, the check and balance of power in the 
region seems to be equally retained in calculations of major states in the 
context of a more multipolar Asia. However, these two “check and balance 
of power” factors are insufficient to allow a conclusion of whether the more 
multipolar Asia might result in a stable system or not. In India-China 
relations, it still remains a question as to how much they can accept each 
other to ensure their legitimacy in each other’s eyes that partly helps them 
respect and reduce competition with each other. Or in other words, the 
stability of Asia therefore depends on the legitimacy of major powers. 
 
Legitimacy of major powers 
 
Explaining the tendency of inter-state war reduction in Asia over the past 
decades, Multhiah Alagappa argues that an increase in legitimacy of nations 
and states along with growing state capacity are elements contributing to the 
transition and strengthening of peace (Alagappa, 2011). Accordingly, 
“legitimacy has international and internal dimensions. External legitimacy is 
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constituted by recognition of sovereignty, identity and territorial boundaries” 
(Ibid p. 16). In light of this idea, I argue that under the multipolar model 
dominated by the US, China and India there are some problems relating to 
the legitimacy of major states. The US might have been the sole superpower 
accepted by the two other powers due to its economic, military and soft 
power capabilities and especially its long-established dominant role after the 
Cold War. However, issues exist with China and India’s legitimacy.  
First of all, China has met obstacles and objections from India, emerging 
states and China’s neighbors involved in territorial disputes. Despite efforts 
to resolve territorial disputes over recent decades, China has not resolved its 
main disputes over Taiwan, Tibet, Aranuchal and maritime territorial 
disputes over Senkaku/Diafao and the South China Sea. China’s South China 
Sea claims consists of 80 percent of sea sovereignty (Vietnam, China seek 
peaceful, stable solutions to sea dispute, thanhniennews, 2013) and has 
caused critical responses from related states, expressed in a symbolic case 
that Manila decided to bring the maritime dispute to the International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea to object China’s aggressive and illegal 
actions in this state’s sea area (Philippines to bring Scarborough Shoal row to 
international court, InqirerGlobalNation, 14
th
 June, 2013). In recent times, 
China troops set up a camp far inside a region claimed by India. 
Nevertheless, after New Delhi threatened to cancel the visit by 2-3 officials 
to China and both sides reached an agreement for a joint pullback, the Army 
began to withdraw (India, China began withdrawing troops from borders, 
2013 and Binh, 2013). Meanwhile, according to most international legal 
experts, the claims of China based on “China’s historical territory since 
ancient times” are invalid because there are several contradictions in China’s 
use of history to justify its claims to islands and reefs in the South China Sea, 
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and “ought to be resolved through a combination of customary international 
law, adjusdication before the International court of Justice or the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or arbitration under Annex VII 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).” 
(Malik, 2013). Furthermore, Malik argues that official Chinese history 
claiming that Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and Hans were all Chinese, 
distorts the complex history. Actually, most Southeast Asian countries 
cannot accept China’s nine-dash line for “a corresponding denial of the very 
identity and history of the ancestors of the Vietnamese, Filipinos, and 
Malays; it is practically a modern revival of China’s denigration of non-
Chinese as ‘barbarians’ not entitled to equal respect and dignity as peoples.” 
(Jay Batongbacal of the University of the Philippines law school, quoted in 
Malik, 2013). 
Secondly, India might accept the leading role of China in shaping Asia’s 
geopolitical future and considers itself as a peer competitor of China in the 
US-China- India triangle (Chris Elder, Robert Ayson, 2012 and Scott, 2008) 
but will China accept India’s rise?. In 2006, Kondapalli put a question “the 
issue is that China has never recognized India...as a major power. China will 
never accept the rise of another power in Asia” like India (quoted in Anejia 
and Kumar, “Tibet, connectivity, Capabilities and Consequences,” p.45). 
Roy also agrees with this view and argues as follows, “China would like 
India to remain locked in South Asia...India has always been seen by Beijing 
as the main stumbling block to a unipolar Asia dominated by China” (quoted 
in Scott, 2008, p. 262).  
 
China has been the main increasing power globally and its increasing 
international clout makes it more confident in its capacity and in pursuing the 
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aspiration which is being the most important candidate for the regional 
dominance. China must not have accepted India as a Great Power and 
supported India to become the leading role in the region due to the potential 
competition of India. In practice, China tried to exclude India in the ASEM 
(Asia-Europe Summit), the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), the 
EAS (East Annual Summit), the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) 
and especially the UNSC (the United Nations Security Council) (Rory 
Medcalf; Ashley Townshend, 2010; Scott, 2008). The purpose of China is to 
maximize Indian influence in the forums and reduce India’s increasing clout 
in the global and international stage. It is right as one analyst said “One 
mountain cannot accommodate two tigers” (Mohan Malik J., 1999) to 
describe the China- India relations.  
.  
Thus, if we agree with the view that China’s legitimacy remains the problem 
and if China cannot accept India’s legitimacy, the stability of Asia clearly 
depends on capabilities of states to “govern effectively, manage international 
interaction, and resist external aggression” (Alagappa, 2011, p. 16). It is 
because that state’s capacity along with legitimacy will help it to be able to 
cope with domestic and international conflict. If the index of a state’s 
legitimacy is not high, the existence as well as influence of the state depends 
on the abilities to manage or resolve issues caused by objections of other 
states in the system or in the government. As shown by Alagappa, this 
assumption was evidence to the stability of the Asian map since 1945 
(Alagappa, 2011).  
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CONCLUSION 
As showed in this thesis, multipolarity and stability have a close relationship 
with each other. However, the stability here is considered not only as war 
avoidance among the great powers but also as the tendency of equilibrium of 
the system. So measuring the stability in Asia requires examining at least 
two factors including war avoidance among the great powers and the 
stability of distribution of power. This research finds that Asia will be more 
multipolar, with more likely the leading dominance of the US, China and 
India, at least in next twenty or thirty years. In theory and reality, the more 
states there are in the system, the more tension and competition and the more 
likely conflicts become. However, in Asia multipolarity lessens the 
likelihood of great power wars due to states’ increasing economic 
interdependence and the security requirements of themselves as states,  
means that these states  “will not wish to court disaster” and will try to 
resolve issues without war (Posen, 2009). Another factor contributing to this 
outcome is India’s traditional autonomy and independence that makes the 
theory of allying between states not probable in this case. Nevertheless, as 
we examine the distribution of power in this pattern, two elements including 
a “check and balance” between great powers in the region seems to be 
sustained, whereas, on the other hand, there are still some problems in states’ 
legitimacy.  
Despite its efforts in resolving territorial disputes and exercising a “charm 
offensive” and some states are more willing to accept China, China’s 
legitimacy has still not been accepted by some other states, especially 
Southeast Asian countries, due to China’s aggressive behaviour and 
ambitions. In addition, the relationship between China and India raises an 
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open question over how far China can accept India’s legitimacy. These 
issues might create more mistrust and misunderstanding between India and 
China and allow potential conflicts or even war in the future. Actually, 
despite such suspicions, I still hope that in context of a more multipolar Asia, 
states will try to avoid unnecessary conflicts to ensure the region’s stability 
and prosperity in general, and each state in particular. This partly is the 
outcome of India’s swing state’s role and responsibility of taking into 
consideration its foreign policies towards the US and China.  
In sum, cooperation and competition for power is the main tendency that is 
likely to persist in Asian multipolarity. Of course, this is not only an outcome 
of the structure of the system but also due to other factors relating to states’ 
perception and understanding. Therefore, in relation of three dyads, the US 
must avoid unilateralism but should not withdraw from the region due to its 
economic interests and the region’s stability. Instead, the US should retain its 
role in Asia, enhance engagement and deepen its commitment into regional 
actions. However, the US should not develop behavior or actions which 
increase China’s mistrust and misunderstanding, including issues relating to 
Taiwan. As for China, its efforts to become the sole regional dominant power 
in Asia should be limited because China’s aggressive behavior and ambition 
might cause negative actions and responses from India. In contrast to this, as 
this thesis has shown, certain countries in Southeast Asia such as Vietnam 
need India as a way of countering Chinese influence in the region. 
Furthermore, the US considers India as a counter-balance with China. It 
might remain an open question whether the alliance between the US and 
India will undermine the process of Sino-Indian normalization and cause the 
instability in the region. As a result, in order to make the situation more 
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stable, India should be wise and clever in dealing with China and the US, 
avoiding an increase in historical mistrust and misunderstanding. 
Finally, as showed in chapter one, this thesis presents the writer’s ideas 
based on defining stability in terms of the tendency to equilibrium. In order 
to achieve better outcomes in measuring stability of Asia multipolarity, we 
should think of the stability of economic cooperation between states and the 
outcomes of building norms and institutions in the region. These factors have 
the ability to reflect the existence and persistence of stability in the region in 
theory and reality. We should not ignore them as a way of measuring the 
stability of the region under different circumstances.   
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